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An Idea of Authorship:  
Orson Welles, The War of the 
Worlds Copyright, and Why We 
Should Recognize Idea-
Contributors as Joint Authors 
Timothy J. McFarlin† 
Abstract 
Did Orson Welles co-author the infamous War of the Worlds broad-
cast? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has told us no, primarily 
because he only contributed the idea behind the broadcast, and ideas 
alone can’t be copyrighted. “An Idea of Authorship” challenges this 
premise—that ideas, no matter how significant, cannot qualify for joint 
authorship in collaborative works—and argues that we as a society 
should, under certain circumstances, recognize idea-contributors like 
Welles as joint authors. We should do so to further our society’s interest 
in encouraging future creations, as well as out of a sense of equity and 
fairness to idea-contributors, acknowledging the value of ideas to creat-
ive work. Recognizing idea-contributors as joint authors would increase 
the contractual bargaining power of many of our society’s most creative 
minds and ultimately better foster the free flow of ideas essential to the 
constitutional goal of promoting the “Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”1 
 
†  Fellow, Legal Method & Communication Program, Elon University School 
of Law; Instructor/Adjunct Professor, Washington University in St. Louis; 
J.D., Saint Louis University School of Law (2006); B.A., University of Missouri 
(2003). Thank you to the National Archives at Riverside and San Francisco 
for preserving and digging up for me the original files from the Welles v. 
CBS case, including the invaluable testimony of Orson Welles and Howard 
Koch. Thank you as well to Professors Rebecca Tushnet, Roberta Kwall, 
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Professors David Levine, Steven Friedland, Enrique Armijo, and Christopher 
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“Miss Kael glosses over the following point . . . ‘[Koch] says it 
was . . . Welles’s idea that he do the Martian show in the form of 
radio bulletins.’ This is a meaningless sentence for those unfam-
iliar with the broadcast, and easily missed by those who may vag-
uely remember it now. Listen to it, though . . . and you will see 
that it is precisely this conception which was the guide for the 
dialogue, radio effects, the whole organization of the material. It 
is the heart of the matter.” 
—Filmmaker and Orson Welles confidant Peter Bogdanovich—
writing together with Welles himself—responding to film critic 
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Pauline Kael’s accusation that Welles improperly claimed author-
ship credit for the War of the Worlds broadcast2 
“ORSON WELLES CAUSES PANIC” 
—Times Square news ticker, hours after the broadcast3 
Flash! Radiating from a CBS broadcast room in New York City the 
night before Halloween, 1938, the news that murderous, alien creatures 
had landed in the small town of Grover’s Mill, New Jersey spread across 
the country like wildfire—the Martians had invaded.4 Headlines the 
next day oozed fear: “Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as 
Fact,” in the New York Times, “FAKE RADIO ‘WAR’ STIRS TERR-
OR THROUGH U.S.,” from the Daily News, “RADIO PLAY TERRIF-
IES NATION,” in The Boston Globe.5 While recent research convinc-
ingly argues that the papers exaggerated the panic and invented the 
legend that entire towns ran for the hills, the research also confirms 
 
2. Peter Bogdanovich, The Kane Mutiny, Esquire, Oct. 1972, at 99, 188; see 
also Peter Bogdanovich, New Introduction: My Orson, in Orson Welles & 
Peter Bogdanovich, This is Orson Welles xxiv (Da Capo Press 1998) 
(1992) (revealing that “Orson had taken a strong hand in revising and 
rewriting” “The Kane Mutiny,” which was published under only Bogdan-
ovich’s name). In their “Kane Mutiny” article, Bogdanovich and Welles 
primarily sought to challenge Kael’s main contention from her 1971 essay 
“Raising Kane” that Welles, not satisfied with merely being its director and 
lead actor, improperly took credit for helping write the screenplay of his 
most famous film, Citizen Kane. Id. at xii–xxvii. 
 A more recent analysis of script drafts that were either unavailable to or 
unexamined by Kael appears to have soundly disproven her claim. See 
Robert L. Carringer, The Making of Citizen Kane 16–35 (rev. ed. 
1996) (discussing Welles’s involvement in writing Citizen Kane). In other 
words, it now seems safe to say that Welles did in fact help write Kane’s 
script. Id.; see also Christopher Saunders, Kael v. Kane: Pauline Kael, Orson 
Welles and the Authorship of Citizen Kane, http://www.popoptiq.com/kael- 
vs-kane-pauline-kael-orson-welles-authorship-citizen-kane/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2TWF-KXY3] (May 10, 2015). 
 It was during her discussion of Kane that Kael briefly mentioned her 
understanding that Welles had also disingenuously sought credit for authoring 
the War of the Worlds broadcast. See Pauline Kael, Raising Kane, in For 
Keeps 274–75, 335 (1994) (originally published in the February 20 and 27, 
1971 issues of The New Yorker). It was to this passing shot that Bogdanovich 
and Welles were responding in their quote above. 
3. Frank Brady, Citizen Welles: A Biography of Orson Welles 173 
(1989). 
4. A. Brad Schwartz, Broadcast Hysteria: Orson Welles’s War of 
the Worlds and the Art of Fake News 3–7, 65–79 (2015). 
5. Id. at 115; Howard Koch, The Panic Broadcast 17–18 (5th ed. 1973). 
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that many people, perhaps thousands, did in fact worry—and some-
times truly believe—that the invasion was real.6 Why? 
By all accounts, listeners believed it because the broadcast was 
written and performed in the style of actual news bulletins, complete 
with breaking announcements, field reporting, and official public alerts.7 
Had the broadcast used a purely narrative form like the H.G. Wells 
novel on which it was based, it’s almost inconceivable that anyone who 
tuned in to the show, much less thousands across America, would have 
actually worried that Martians were taking over the Earth.8 And with-
out this reaction, it’s equally unlikely that radio’s War of the Worlds 
would have become the cultural phenomenon and legendary mass media 
event that we remember today. 
So who caused this reaction? Who was the broadcast’s author? 
Most of us, thinking back to our school days or simply reaching into 
our brain’s pop culture databanks would likely say “Orson Welles,” or 
we’d at least guess that he played some significant role in its authorship. 
We’d be wrong, though, at least if we asked the courts. That’s because 
in 1962, in the case of Welles v. CBS,9 the Ninth Circuit Court of App-
eals affirmed a trial court ruling that Orson Welles was “neither author 
nor a co-author” of the War of the Worlds broadcast.10 
Despite ruling against Welles, the courts did recognize that it was 
his idea to adapt the War of the Worlds novel into a series of radio 
bulletins describing the Martian invasion as it was happening.11 No one 
 
6. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 65–94; see also Joy Elizabeth Hayes & Kathleen 
Battles, Exchange and Interconnection in US Network Radio: A Reinterpret-
ation of the 1938 War of the Worlds Broadcast, in War of the Worlds 
to Social Media: Mediated Communication in Times of Crisis 28–31 
(Joy Elizabeth Hayes et al. eds., 2013) (describing various reactions that 
listeners had to the War of the Worlds broadcast). 
7. See Hayes & Battles, supra note 6, at 24–25; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 
69–82. 
8. Or worried that some other disaster had befallen our country, like a major 
meteor-strike or a terrestrial invasion by the Germans, which many who had 
heard only part of the broadcast or got their news second-hand apparently 
thought had happened. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 88–90. Wittily 
commenting on the audience’s fearful reaction, and referencing the top-rated 
competing show that night (which featured the Charlie McCarthy ventrilo-
quist act), the renowned critic for The New Yorker Alexander Woollcott 
telegrammed Welles soon after the broadcast: “This only goes to prove, my 
beamish boy, that the intelligent people were all listening to a dummy, and 
all the dummies were listening to you.” Welles & Bogdanovich, supra 
note 2, at 18. 
9.  308 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962). 
10. Id. at 812 n.1. 
11. Id. (“Plaintiff conceived the idea of presenting said radio broadcast of an 
adaptation of H. G. Wells’ novel, ‘The War Of The Worlds’ and also conceived 
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disputed that Welles, as the broadcast’s lead producer and director, 
had asked his co-producer John Houseman to communicate this bulletin 
idea to one of the writers they worked with, Howard Koch, with the 
instruction to draft a script in that form.12 Houseman did so, and Koch 
wrote a simulated live news broadcast announcing the Martian invasion 
of Earth described in the novel.13 Welles edited and approved the script, 
and then he, along with other actors from his and Houseman’s Mercury 
Theatre group, performed War of the Worlds on the radio that fateful 
night of October 30, 1938.14 Though Welles testified that he helped 
more with the writing of the script (not simply its editing) than either 
Koch in his deposition or Houseman in his memoirs would admit, no-
body challenged these basic facts of Welles’s creative involvement.15 
Why then, despite these facts, did the trial court find, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirm, that Welles played no part in authoring the War  
the idea of dramatizing said novel by means of radio announcements describing 
the contemporaneous invasion of Martians.”). 
12. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 44–46. Lawyers and law students might best 
know John Houseman from his late-career renaissance as an actor, most 
particularly in his Oscar-winning role as Harvard Law Professor Charles 
W. Kingsfield, Jr. in the 1973 film The Paper Chase. John Houseman, 
Unfinished Business: A Memoir 459–73 (1989). In yet another connection 
between The War of the Worlds and the law, Howard Koch was a Columbia 
Law graduate who left the practice to become a writer, eventually winning 
an Oscar for co-writing the screenplay for Casablanca. Howard Koch, As 
Time Goes By 35–41, 76–84 (1979).  
13. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 49–51. 
14. Id. at 58–64. Other members of the Mercury Theatre group, such as associate 
producer Paul Stewart, may well have helped edit and shape the script into 
its final form during the rehearsal process, but the exact extent to which they 
were involved—given the hurried nature of the broadcast’s preparations and 
the limits of human memory—is ultimately unclear. Id. at 58–64, 252–54. 
15. Id. at 247–48 n.95, 252–54; see infra notes 90–114 and accompanying text 
(discussing Welles’s testimony about the conception of the War of the Worlds 
broadcast). Houseman was not called to testify in the lawsuit, for reasons 
unclear. See Welles, 308 F.2d at 813. Though the full, tempestuous story of 
Welles and Houseman’s friendship and creative partnership is outside the scope 
of this Article (indeed it could form its own small book), it suffices to say here 
that not long after the broadcast the two men ended their partnership, and a 
deep gulf grew between them. Their broken friendship is my best guess as to 
why Welles’s lawyers did not take Houseman’s deposition in the case, i.e., 
Welles could reasonably have feared that Houseman’s testimony would only 
hurt him. See, e.g., Welles & Bogdanovich, supra note 2, at xxii–xxiii 
(relaying a fairly incendiary claim by Welles that Houseman, though married, 
“had been in love with Welles” and that Welles had said “he had probably not 
handled this right and instead got into a terrible public row with Houseman,” 
thus ending their partnership); Houseman, supra note 12, at 340–41 (describing 
a later chance encounter with Welles where, “I could feel the muscles of my 
arms tensing—ready to fly up to parry the haymaker that would be aimed at 
my head or to return the bear hug in which I would be enveloped.”). 
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of the Worlds radio play? Under prevailing law, both in 1938 and today, 
the contribution of ideas and ideas alone—no matter how vital—did 
not and does not constitute authorship of a copyrightable work.16 In 
other words, if you contribute ideas to a collaborative creation but your 
collaborator is the only one who writes them down (or puts them into 
some other tangible medium of expression), you cannot qualify as a 
joint author of that creation.17 So, because the trial court found that 
Orson Welles contributed only ideas to the War of the Worlds radio 
play, he did not share in any part of its authorship. Howard Koch, who 
wrote the script that incorporated and expressed Welles’s idea, was the 
sole author. 
I believe that this rule—collaborators who contribute ideas, and 
ideas alone, cannot be joint authors of copyrightable works—reflects a 
fundamentally flawed conception of authorship, one which ignores the 
reality of the creative process and prevents artists like Welles from ob-
taining the credit and compensation they deserve. Sometimes, as with 
The War of the Worlds, an idea can be so vital to a collaborative work—
indeed, in the words of Bogdanovich and Welles,18 it can be the very 
“heart of the matter”—that the idea’s generator deserves to be consid-
ered the work’s joint author. 
In a previous article, I examined how copyright’s current joint auth-
orship tests would have blocked a non-dominant collaborator, the pian-
ist Johnnie Johnson, from any chance of establishing joint authorship 
of a significant number of Chuck Berry’s songs, despite compelling 
 
16. Foster v. Lee, 93 F. Supp. 3d 223, 227–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]o qualify as 
a joint work . . . the contribution of each author must itself be independently 
eligible for copyright protection.” (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 
505 (2d Cir. 1991))); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright 
protection . . . extend to any idea.”); Welles, 308 F.2d at 814; Baker v. Selden, 
101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879). See generally 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David 
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07 (2015) [hereinafter Nimmer] 
(discussing the law of joint authorship).  
17. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 16, at § 6.07 (discussing the law of joint 
authorship). This is true unless you have a written contract to the contrary. 
But see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 Va. L. 
Rev. 1683, 1748–50 (2014) (noting the Copyright Act does not expressly 
contemplate that parties can contract around its definition of “joint work” 
but that a written agreement between or among collaborators can function 
as an assignment of copyright ownership that results in a jointly owned work 
even if, by the strict terms of the Act, the work was not actually created 
jointly). For why the possibility of entering into a contract is not a sufficient 
solution for idea-contributors in these situations, see infra notes 178–194 
and accompanying text. A few judges have questioned the independent copy-
rightability requirement for joint authorship, but they’re in a very small 
minority. See infra note 39. 
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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evidence that he helped Berry create them.19 Here, Welles v. CBS shows 
how the law’s present formulation of joint authorship isn’t just stacked 
against non-dominant collaborators (i.e., those who contribute to the 
creation of a copyrightable work but who aren’t making the final creat-
ive decisions).20 By the current tests’ bright-line requirement that each 
collaborator contribute independently copyrightable expression, even 
dominant collaborators like Orson Welles can be unfairly and improp-
erly blocked from the status and rewards of joint authorship. The con-
tribution of ideas, because they aren’t by themselves copyrightable,21 
will not qualify even the most dominant and genius of collaborators for 
authorship in a jointly created work. 
Thus, regardless of whether the courts or Congress adopt a new 
formulation of joint authorship like my previously proposed “Berry-
Johnson” test,22 the Welles case compellingly illustrates why the inde-
pendent copyrightability requirement should be discarded from any test 
 
19. Timothy J. McFarlin, Father(s?) of Rock & Roll: Why the Johnnie Johnson 
v. Chuck Berry Songwriting Suit Should Change the Way Copyright Law 
Determines Joint Authorship, 17 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 575, 602 (2015). 
20. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing 
that an author is usually “‘the inventive or master mind’ who ‘creates, or 
gives effect to the idea.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884))); see also 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 
791 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Lee on this point with approval); 
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015) (approving Lee’s 
determination of joint authorship). See McFarlin, supra note 19, at 647–51, 
for a fuller discussion of the problems with Lee’s “mastermind” view of joint 
authorship. 
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend 
to any idea.”); see also infra notes 24–35 and accompanying text. 
22. McFarlin, supra note 19, at 654–55. The Berry-Johnson test would require 
a joint authorship claimant to establish two things: 
(1) all purported joint authors intended to merge their contributions 
into one work; and 
(2) the claimant substantially contributed to the essence of the work. 
Id. at 654. To decide the second requirement, the test directs the court to 
consider: 
(1) the impact that the claimant’s contribution had on the work 
relative to that of other contributions; 
(2) any evidence that other contributors viewed the claimant as 
having substantially contributed to the essence of the work; and 
(3) any relevant custom or practice, in the industry or field in which 
the work was created, that treats (or does not treat) contributions 
similar to the claimant’s as joint authorship of works similar to the 
one at issue. 
 Id. at 654–55. 
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to determine whether a copyrighted work was authored jointly. Not 
only is the current rule unjust to Welles and other idea-contributors, 
but removing this barrier will also promote the arts by encouraging the 
free flow of ideas among future creative collaborators. 
To further explain why the contribution of ideas should qualify for 
joint authorship, Part I of this Article explores how and why the courts 
imported copyright’s “expression-only” rule into joint authorship in the 
first place. Part II then details the creation of The War of The Worlds 
in print and on the radio—most particularly as it was described in the 
sworn testimony of Orson Welles and Howard Koch in Welles v. CBS—
and demonstrates that, through his idea, Welles contributed substan-
tially to the broadcast’s creation. Last, Part III addresses concerns over 
expanding joint authorship to include ideas, and it ultimately suggests 
why and how idea-contributors like Orson Welles should qualify as joint 
authors of collaborative works. 
I. Copyright and Ideas: An Uneasy Relationship 
“The working out of the idea is in the script. There is no right in 
an idea.” 
—Federal District Judge Leon Yankwich, ruling from the bench 
in Welles v. CBS23 
A. The Uncopyrightable Idea 
Copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not ideas them-
selves. We find this principle at the start of the Copyright Act itself, 
which firmly tells us that “[i]n no case does copyright protection 
 . . . extend to any idea.”24 Though first codified in 1976, this express-
ion-only rule dates back in the common law for more than a century, 
and courts both state and federal, trial and appellate have placed their 
trust in it in the years since.25 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
called it the “most fundamental axiom of copyright law.”26 
 
23. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 202, Welles v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc. (C.D. Cal. 1961) (No. 1014-59-Y) [hereinafter “Transcript”]. 
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
25. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 16, § 2.03[D] (discussing the history of the 
distinction between ideas and expression); Leon R. Yankwich, Originality in 
the Law of Intellectual Property (Its Meaning from a Legal and Literary 
Standpoint), 11 F.R.D. 457, 457–61 (1952) (affirming that copyright protects 
not ideas but the expression of ideas); Ronald B. Standler, Ideas Not 
Copyrightable (2013) http://www.rbs2.com/cidea.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M9JZ-83VX] (referring to the legion of cases cited therein). 
26. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991). Some 
states, however, such as California and New York, recognize a limited right 
to protect an idea—not under copyright law—but under state contract law. 
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Copyright’s expression-only rule serves a vital purpose. It encour-
ages people to transfer ideas from mind to print (or other media) so 
that we as a society might fully reap their benefit. If the architect of 
the Empire State Building, for instance, had a wonderful idea for a 
structure but didn’t first put pen to paper for the blueprints, we would-
n’t have that beautiful building to use and admire.27 
This pen-to-paper principle also serves other vital purposes. First, 
it creates a tangible way with which to draw the bounds of copyright 
protection. An idea by itself can be hazy, uncertain—limitless even—
whereas its expression, whether in print, on record, film, or other mat-
erial, has much more finite and observable contours.28 Our legislators, 
 
See generally David E. Fink & Damaris M. Diaz, Hey That Was My Idea! 
Understanding Damages in Idea Submission, 2012 Comm. Law. 4, 4 (“It is 
long established that ideas, ‘free as the air’ as they may be, are sometimes 
protectable by implied contracts.”). For example, plaintiffs in “idea submission” 
cases under California law must prove: 
(1) they clearly conditioned the submission of their ideas on an oblig-
ation to pay for any use of their ideas; 
(2) the defendants, knowing this condition before the plaintiffs dis-
closed the ideas, voluntarily accepted the submission of the ideas; and 
(3) the defendants found the ideas valuable and actually used them—
that is, the defendants based their work substantially on the plaintiffs’ 
ideas, rather than on their own ideas or ideas from other sources. 
 Spinner v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 4th 172, 184 (2013) 
(citing Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc. 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533–34, 533–
34 n.6 (1982)). For the problems with relying on a state-by-state contract 
law solution to protecting idea-contributors, see infra notes 182–184 and 
accompanying text. 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . Works 
of authorship include . . . architectural works.”); see also Mary Jane Augustine 
& Christopher S. Dunn, Consequences of Ownership or Licensing of the 
Project Drawings-If You Pay for It, Do You Own It?, 28 Constr. Law. 
35, 64 n.66 (2008) (noting that the copyright in a building’s design will likely 
vest, absent a work-for-hire situation, in the “design professional who draws 
the plans”). 
 Walter F. Lamb of the architectural firm Shreve, Lamb & Harmon designed 
the Empire State Building, which was inspired in part by an earlier design 
the firm had done for the Reynolds Building in Winston-Salem, North Caro-
lina. See Empire State Building, A Landmark, CBS Forum (Feb. 17, 2004), 
http://www.cbsforum.com/cgibin/articles/partners/cbs/search.cgi?template 
=display&dbname=cbsarticles&key2=empire&action=searchdbdisplay 
[http://perma.cc/J77J-DBK8]; Owen Covington, A Look at the Historic 
Reynolds Building, Triad Bus. J. (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.bizjournals. 
com/triad/blog/2012/01/a-new-start-for-historic-rj-reynolds.html?page=all  
[http://perma.cc/Q6FC-727G]. 
28. See, e.g., Todd Marabella, Note, Elemental Copyright: The Complexity of 
Ideas and the Alchemy of Mind-Share, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2149, 2155 (2010) 
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judges, and juries can use these contours to decide the scope of protec-
tion a creative work should receive under copyright law. A building’s 
blueprints allow a judge or jury to determine the protectable elements 
of the building’s design—such as the particular arrangement and comp-
osition of its spaces—and then decide whether another architect has 
improperly copied those elements in his or her own design.29 
Second, the expression-only rule prevents copyright from treading 
too heavily on our freedom of speech. Copyright, of course, inherently 
intrudes to a certain extent.30 Our speech is not so free that we can, 
without legal consequences, intentionally write the same (or even sub-
stantially the same) book as one that is copyrighted. But we are free 
to use the general ideas incorporated in the book.31 So, while we can’t 
write a novel about a young wizard named Harry Potter who studies 
at Hogwarts, we can write one about young wizards at school.32 This 
distinction—between an idea and the protectable expression of an 
 
(“By granting a copyright monopoly over the idea of a shoe to one person, a 
court would in fact be granting a monopoly over the boundless range of all 
the different types of shoes.”). 
29. See, e.g., Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 
1148, 1169 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) (analyzing 
a copyright infringement claim concerning competing architectural designs) 
(“In evaluating substantial similarity in this case, the Court has viewed the 
competing designs side by side to identify and evaluate their shared character-
istics. Specifically, with the parties’ assistance, the Court has compiled a list 
of elements in Oravec’s design which he alleges evidence substantial similarity. 
The Court has then evaluated those elements to determine whether they 
are features which copyright protects. Finally, the Court has analyzed these 
elements, individually and collectively, to determine whether there is enough 
similarity so that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict 
for Oravec that the designs are substantially similar.”). 
30. Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel”, 38 Emory 
L.J. 393, 393–94 (1989) (“To the extent that copyright dictates the manner 
in which an author may express herself, it infringes the author’s freedom of 
expression.”); Amaury Cruz, Comment, What’s the Big Idea Behind the Idea- 
Expression Dichotomy?—Modern Ramifications of the Tree of Porphyry in 
Copyright Law, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 221, 230 (1990) (“The apparent 
contradiction between the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amend-
ment and the copyright clause which limits such freedom, creates a unique 
constitutional conflict.”). 
31. See Yen, supra note 30, at 394; Cruz, supra note 30, at 230; see also Paul 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 
(1970); Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guaran-
tees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970). 
32. See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (1997). 
For a more detailed discussion of why an author cannot copyright the concept 
of young wizards going to school, see infra notes 199–206 and accompanying 
text. 
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idea—is not always easy to make, but the very fact that the distinction 
exists allows the courts to do their best to prevent a monopolization of 
ideas that would limit the progress of the arts instead of promoting it.33 
We can see, then, that an idea in the copyright context has come 
to mean creativity that either (a) has yet to be fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression, or (b) is too abstract or common to form the 
basis of a valid infringement action.34 And we also see that there are 
very good reasons why such creativity, on its own, is uncopyrightable. 
But if an idea has been expressed in a tangible medium, and we can 
thereby both benefit from that idea and specify its limited protectable 
contours, why then should it matter that it was the idea-generator’s 
collaborator that put the idea into a tangible medium and not the idea-
generator himself? The audience for the work doesn’t care—the idea 
has been expressed and can now be enjoyed, regardless of how that 
expression occurred. Other artists shouldn’t care either, in that the or-
iginal expression of the work is the only aspect that courts will look to 
in deciding whether another work has infringed its copyright. Everyone 
is still free to use the idea. 
In other words, we’re not talking about granting a monopoly in 
ideas, we’re talking about protecting (or ignoring) the rights of those 
who contribute ideas to tangibly expressed works—a close but vital 
distinction. Just because an idea alone is uncopyrightable, this doesn’t 
mean that the person who contributes an idea to a tangibly expressed 
work can’t share in its copyright.35 
For example, if U.S. copyright law had recognized Orson Welles as 
a joint author of the final written script for the War of the Worlds 
broadcast, that wouldn’t have made Welles the owner of the idea he 
contributed. It would simply have made him a co-owner, with Howard 
Koch, of the final written script. Welles could not have prevented others 
 
33. See Goldstein, supra note 31, at 1016–20; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
(granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
34. See Nimmer, supra note 16, at § 2.03[D] (discussing the distinction between 
ideas and expression); 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 4:31 
(2015). 
35. I’m not saying that we can’t judge a given idea in a given case to be too 
abstract or general (see supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text) to entitle 
its contributor to joint authorship in the final work. To the contrary, as 
detailed infra in notes 199–206 and accompanying text, I propose that we 
use the relative specificity of an idea as a vital consideration in deciding joint 
authorship on a case-by-case basis. I’m simply saying here that the mere 
fact the contribution is an idea—either in the sense that it hasn’t been put 
into a tangible medium or in the sense that it might, standing alone, be too 
abstract or common to form the basis of a valid infringement action—should 
not disqualify its contributor from joint authorship as a matter of law. 
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from doing fake news broadcasts. He and Koch could only have con-
trolled the use of whatever parts of the script that constituted protect-
able expression, such as the dialogue specifically created for the broad-
cast. 
Therefore, if we truly want to examine why we should or shouldn’t 
recognize idea-contributors as joint authors, we can’t just say “ideas 
are uncopyrightable” and stop there. We need to dig deeper. We need 
to look, first, at the underlying reasons why courts have shut idea-
contributors out of joint authorship. 
B. Why the Expression-Only Rule Has Become Part  
of Joint Authorship Doctrine 
“The supplier of an idea is no more an author of a [computer] 
program than is the supplier of the disk on which the program is 
stored.” 
—Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, in the case of S.O.S., 
Inc. v. Payday36 
The incredible quote—equating, in terms of authorship, the brill-
iant concept behind Twitter with the plastic of an old floppy disk—
illustrates the depth of disdain the courts presently have for idea-
contributors in collaborative creative endeavors. How did we get to this 
point? While the Copyright Act expressly forbids copyright in ideas 
alone, thereby making tangible expression a prerequisite for copyright 
in a creative work, nowhere does it state that each joint author must 
contribute tangible expression.37 Regarding joint authorship, the Act 
simply states that “[a] ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into in-
separable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”38 In other words, 
the Copyright Act does not expressly state that each and every joint 
author of a creative work must put his or her ideas into a tangible 
medium of expression. Why then have the courts interpreted the Act 
this way? 
 
36. 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989). This direct quote was recited as recently 
as 2010 by the Eastern District of California. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. 
v. Pardini, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Courts have cited 
S.O.S. with approval on this point, as counted by Westlaw, thirty-nine times. 
37. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications 
for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1, 53 (2001). The concept is also absent from the legislative history 
leading up to the 1976 Act. See id. at 37, 48, 53, 57–59; Laura G. Lape, A 
Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint Work 
Doctrine, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 43, 44–74 (1997). 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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From the surprisingly few cases where courts have actually explain-
ed why they’ve imported this expression-only requirement into joint 
authorship, two main reasons emerge: (1) they believe that the word 
“author” as used in the Copyright Act necessarily means a person who 
contributes tangible expression, and (2) they’re concerned that bringing 
idea-contributors into the joint authorship fold would invite frivolous 
litigation.39 
With respect to the first reason, courts have interpreted “author” 
to mean “the fixer” (i.e., the one who actually fixes the idea or ideas 
into a tangible medium of expression).40 And because, to these courts,  
39. For cases relying on the meaning of the word author, see, for example, 
Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. v. M & S Tech., Inc., No. 06 C 3234, 2008 WL 
623660, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2008); BancTraining Video Sys. v. First Am. 
Corp., 956 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992); BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619, 
626 (E.D. La. 1999). For cases citing public policy reasons, see, for example, 
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504–05 (2d Cir. 1991), and its progeny. 
 A few judges in recent years have, however, challenged this anti-idea-
contributor orthodoxy. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in 2004, recognized that where a copyrightable work is created by 
multiple persons, but none of them in isolation contributed independently 
copyrightable expression to the work, the independently copyrightability 
requirement logically must be discarded, or else there would be no legal owner 
of the work. See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 Fourth Circuit Judge Roger Gregory, in 2006, dissented in an unpublished 
case dismissing a copyright joint authorship claim on the ground, among 
others, that the plaintiff failed to allege that he made an independently 
copyrightable contribution to the work at issue. Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. 
App’x 178, 183–91 (4th Cir. 2006) (Gregory, J., dissenting). Judge Gregory 
stated his belief that a “substantial original contribution” to a work would 
qualify a contributor for joint authorship. Id. at 189. 
 And in a decision that was later vacated (due to the orthodox rule), former 
federal district Judge Marvin Aspen stated that the proper standard for 
evaluating a joint authorship claim is whether a collaborator made a 
“significant creative contribution.” Napoli v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 835 F. 
Supp. 1053, 1062–63 (N.D. Ill. 1993), vacated on reconsideration, 858 F. Supp. 
101 (N.D. Ill. 1994), and vacated sub nom., 926 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 Most recently, the First Circuit, without acknowledging the potential conflict 
with the orthodox rule, stated (albeit in dicta) that “[i]t is not necessary that 
the authors’ contributions be quantitatively or qualitatively equal, only that 
each author’s contribution be more than de minimis.” Greene v. Ablon, 794 
F.3d 133, 151 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 These judicial views are, at least at present, in the extreme minority. Even 
courts who have expressed some support for Judge Posner’s Gaiman decision 
have refused to extend it past the “only if no collaborator contributed 
independently copyrightable expression” scenario. See Janky v. Lake County 
Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009); Woods 
v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 819 n.3 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
40. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994) (“An 
author is ‘the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who 
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a collaborative endeavor can constitute a joint work “only if both the 
collaborators can be considered an author independently,”41 each joint 
author must necessarily contribute original, tangible expression to the 
overall creative work.42 As for the second reason, courts have openly 
worried that recognizing idea-contributors as joint authors could en-
courage “spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to share the 
 
translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright 
protection.’” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
737 (1989))). 
 It is noteworthy that Erickson and similar cases have selectively omitted the 
first part of the quotation from Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion in 
CCNV, which in full reads, “As a general rule, the author is the party who 
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into 
a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.” Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added); see also Russ 
Versteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1323, 1326 (1996). 
 A limited exception that the courts have recognized to this definition of 
author as “fixer” is where the person who fixes the work only performs the 
work of a stenographer. See, e.g., Andrien v. S. Ocean Cty. Chamber of 
Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1991). So, for instance, where an 
attorney is orally dictating a memorandum to her assistant who is typing 
the exact dictation into a memo, the attorney would be the author, not the 
assistant. 
 Some, like the former Register of Copyrights, have suggested that the inde-
pendent copyrightability requirement may be constitutionally mandated 
through its use of the term “authors.” Childress, 945 F.2d at 505; see 2 Patry, 
supra note 34, § 5:14 (referencing expression as necessary to “the constitutional 
requirement of being an ‘author’”). That argument has not appeared to have 
taken hold like the statutory argument—and it was expressly questioned by 
Childress, the case most responsible for cementing the independent copyright-
ability requirement into joint authorship doctrine—though at least one court 
has approvingly cited the Constitution in denying a joint authorship claim. 
Compare Childress, 945 F.2d at 506 (“[T]he Register’s tentative constitutional 
argument seems questionable. It has not been supposed that the statutory 
grant of ‘authorship’ status to the employer of a work made for hire exceeds 
the Constitution, though the employer has shown skill only in selecting 
employees, not in creating protectable expression.”), with Gillespie v. AST 
Sportswear, Inc., No. 97Civ.1911(PKL), 2001 WL 180147, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 2001) (“Miles’s contributions went beyond mere ideas, which, under 
the Copyright Act, the Constitution, and common law, are not copyright-
able.”). See infra notes 146–149 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of the constitutionality of recognizing idea-contributors as joint authors. 
41. Beasley v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 11 CV 4973, 2013 WL 4564857, 
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2013).  
42. Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sol., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 107–108 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
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fruits of the efforts of a sole author.”43 In other words, straying outside 
the bounds of tangible expression—hence, outside the bounds of hard, 
hold-in-your hands, see-with-your-eyes proof—might invite imposters 
to claim that they contributed an idea to what in reality was a solely 
authored work. 
Addressing these concerns—both statutory and policy-based—we’ll 
look here at the language of the Copyright Act, as well as at our 
common-sense understanding of authorship, and see that the better 
reading of the word “authors” includes idea-contributors. We’ll also 
look at the policy arguments for and against recognizing idea-contrib-
utors as joint authors. These arguments prove to be more complicated 
than determining the meaning of authorship, but I think that what we 
as a society can gain from recognizing idea-contributors will ultimately 
outweigh any real (or imagined) concerns over frivolous litigation and 
other possible problems. 
But before we delve into the Copyright Act’s wording or the policy 
arguments, let’s first examine The War of the Worlds’ creation, as well 
as the unfortunate struggle over its copyright. Through this examin-
ation we might better understand how and to what extent an idea can 
influence the final product of a collaborative copyrighted work. We 
might also more fully appreciate the consequences of leaving idea-con-
tributors like Orson Welles unprotected by copyright. And finally, our 
judgments about if and how to recognize idea-contributors as joint 
authors can more firmly root themselves in the realities of the creative 
process. 
II. Essential Ideas: The War of the Worlds’ Creation 
in Print and on the Air 
“We laymen have always been curious to know . . . from what 
source that strange being, the creative writer, draws his material, 
and how he manages to make such an impression on us with it.” 
—Sigmund Freud44 
The “panic broadcast,” as The War of the Worlds is now infamously 
remembered, has ceased to exist as simply a creative work; it has 
ascended into the clouds of cultural legend. The details of the show 
itself—Orson Welles’s narration at the show’s start, full of sinister fore-
boding, followed by what promised to be a night of banal orchestral  
43. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507. E.g., SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 
117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 
2d 619, 625 (E.D. La. 1999) (quoting Childress). 
44. As quoted in Scott Barry Kaufman & James C. Kaufman, Preface to The 
Psychology of Creative Writing, at xix (Scott Barry Kaufman & James 
C. Kaufman eds., 2009). 
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music, suddenly interrupted by bulletins of a strange landing, gruesome 
creatures, and ultimately chaos, destruction, and death—have been re-
counted in a multitude of articles, studies, and books across academic 
disciplines.45 
So too has the reaction that followed—people praying, fleeing their 
homes, calling the police, newspapers screaming suicide, heart attack, 
and general pandemonium—been thoroughly documented elsewhere, 
most recently in A. Brad Schwartz’s excellent book Broadcast Hysteria: 
Orson Welles’s War of the Worlds and the Art of Fake News.46 
Here then we’ll not rehash all the particulars of the performance or 
its chaotic aftermath, but instead focus our attention on its genesis, 
from book to broadcast, seeking to mine from it some truth about the 
collaborative process and the importance of an idea. 
A.  First Conception: The Wells Brothers 
“[I]ntellects vast and cool and unsympathetic, regarded this earth 
with envious eyes, and slowly and surely drew their plans against 
us.” 
—H.G. Wells, from the novel The War of the Worlds47 
One spring day in 1895, Herbert George Wells, a twenty-eight-year-
old former science teacher turned critic and novelist, left his home in 
the town of Woking, England for a walk with his brother Frank.48 Stroll-
ing down the tranquil pathways, the brothers began to speak of Eng-
land’s recent atrocities in colonial Tasmania, off the coast of Australia. 
There, in the name of civilization, their nation had all but eliminated 
the indigenous Aborigines, a people who had made the island their home  
45. See Schwartz, supra note 4; Koch, Panic Broadcast, supra note 5; 
John Gosling, Waging the War of the Worlds: A History of the 
1938 Radio Broadcast and Resulting Panic, Including the Original 
Script (2009); The War of the Worlds: Mars’ Invasion of Earth, 
Inciting Panic and Inspiring Terror from H.G. Wells to Orson 
Welles and Beyond (Sourcebooks Mediafusion 2005); Harry M. Geduld, 
Welles or Wells?—A Matter of Adaptation, in Perspectives on Orson 
Welles (Morris Beja ed., 1995); Alan Gallop, THE MARTIANS ARE 
COMING! The True Story of Orson Welles’ 1938 Panic Broadcast 
(2011); Michelle Spietz, Aural Chiaroscuro: The Emergency Radio Broadcast 
in Orson Welles’s The War of the Worlds, 46.1 English Language Notes 
193 (Spring/Summer 2008). 
46. Schwartz, supra note 4; e.g., Hayes & Battles, supra note 6; Koch, Panic 
Broadcast, supra note 5; Hadley Cantril, The Invasion from Mars: 
A Study in the Psychology of Panic (1940). 
47. H.G. Wells, The War of the Worlds: A Critical Text of the 1898 
London First Edition, with an Introduction, Illustrations and 
Appendices 52 (Leon Stover ed., 2001). 
48. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 47–48. 
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for thousands of years.49 Looking over the serene English countryside 
and pondering the carnage wrought overseas, Frank Wells thought 
aloud to his brother, “Suppose some beings from another planet were 
to drop out of the sky suddenly, and begin laying about them here!”50 
Frank Wells’ idea—that a seemingly secure, powerful people would 
suddenly find themselves under the thumb of a vicious, technologically 
superior race—sparked his brother’s imagination. H.G., who was al-
ready about to publish the first of his novels, The Time Machine, decid-
ed to use the idea as the basis for his next project, the story of an alien 
invasion.51 
H.G. Wells’ new novel told a tale of advanced beings, launched 
from Mars in metallic, missile-like craft, which land in Wells’ town of 
Woking.52 There the Martians construct gigantic three-legged war 
machines that, with the aid of “heat rays” and poison “black smoke,” 
sweep across England, decimating its military and rendering its popul-
ation defenseless.53 The novel’s protagonist and narrator—an unnamed 
writer similar to Wells himself—struggles to get to his wife while wit-
nessing such ghastly sights as the invaders guzzling his countrymen’s 
blood.54 Finally reaching his wife in London, the narrator finds the Mar-
tians dying from exposure to earthly germs, ones that had “taken toll 
of humanity since the beginning of things,” but which had now become 
its “microscopic allies” and the invaders’ doom.55 
Upon its publication, and in the years to follow, The War of the 
Worlds became a worldwide sensation and the cornerstone of a new 
genre: science fiction. Wells dedicated the first edition with the inscrip-
tion, “To My Brother Frank Wells, This Rendering of His Idea.”56 
Forward in time, then, forty-one years later, and unbeknownst to 
the Wells brothers, The War of the Worlds was to take on a new and 
altogether unexpected existence, owing to another mind, that of a man 
with nearly the same last name. 
 
49. Id. This conflict was known to the British as the “Black War.” Black War: 
Australian History, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/ 
event/Black-War [http://perma.cc/KU8L-BFZ2] (last visited Dec. 30, 2015). 
50. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 47–48. 
51. Id. 
52. Id.; Wells, supra note 47, at 52–71. 
53. Wells, supra note 47, at 72–125. 
54. Id. at 175, 187. 
55. Id. at 241. 
56. Id. at 49, 284; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 47–48 (discussing Frank 
Wells’ role in creating the The War of the Worlds). 
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B. Mercury Rising 
“My big inventions were in radio and the theatre. Much more 
than in movies.” 
—Orson Welles57 
Across the Atlantic, forty years after the War of the Worlds novel 
was first published, a precocious young actor, writer, and director was 
causing quite a stir. Twenty-three-year-old George Orson Welles had 
by 1938 already acted in over thirty different stage productions, direct-
ing many of them as well.58 He had also voiced characters on over thirty 
radio broadcasts, often shuttling in a matter of minutes (sometimes via 
a rented, sirens-blaring ambulance) from a just-completed Broadway 
production to the studio to begin a live show.59 “[T]he brightest moon 
that has risen over Broadway in years,” gushed Time, “Welles should 
feel at home in the sky, for the sky is the only limit which his ambitions 
recognised.”60 
Coveting this fount of talent, the Columbia Broadcasting System 
offered Welles his own radio series in the spring of 1938.61 As it gave 
him what he desired most—complete creative control and enough mon-
ey to help finance his stage productions—Welles leapt at the chance.62 
 
57. As quoted in Paul Heyer, The Medium and the Magician: Orson 
Welles, the Radio Years, 1934–1952 vii (2005). 
58. Welles & Bogdanovich, supra note 2, at 326–42. 
59. Orson Welles on the Air: The Radio Years 43–50 (1988) [hereinafter 
The Radio Years]. Filmmaker Henry Jaglom would recall what Welles 
had told him of those ambulance trips: 
 Orson said there were many nights when he took an ambulance three 
to four times, back and forth. He also said that those were the moments 
when he felt most creative, because he’d lie down in the back of the 
ambulance and start thinking about what he was doing next 
. . . speeding through the New York theater-time traffic on the way 
between the radio station and the theater.  
 Id. at 43. 
60. Simon Callow, Orson Welles: The Road to Xanadu 377 (1995) 
(quoting Time Magazine). 
61. Heyer, supra note 57, at 45; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 39–40. 
62. Heyer, supra note 57, at 45. Welles and Houseman published a manifesto 
for the series (perhaps foreshadowing Charles Kane’s manifesto in the Inquirer) 
in the New York Times: “Mercury . . . plan[s] to bring to radio the experi-
mental techniques that have proven so successful in another medium and 
to treat radio itself with the intelligence and respect such a beautiful and 
powerful medium deserves.” Gosling, supra note 45, at 32; see also The 
Radio Years, supra note 59, at 50; Callow, supra note 60, at 372 (stating 
that CBS “offered Welles a total budget of $50,000 for nine programmes, 
out of which he had to pay for everything but the orchestra”). Welles’s $50,000 
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Originally titled First Person Singular, later renamed to The 
Mercury Theatre on the Air, the CBS series featured Welles’s deep, 
sonorous narration complemented by a chorus of talented actors from 
the Mercury Theatre, the Broadway troupe headed by Welles and his 
co-producer John Houseman.63 Beginning with their July 11 debut and 
continuing each week into December 1938, Welles and his Mercury 
collaborators transformed classic and contemporary literature into live 
radio broadcasts, bringing exciting new narration, dialogue, sound 
effects, and dramatic timing to such renowned works as Treasure 
Island, Dracula, A Tale of Two Cities, The Count of Monte Cristo, 
Julius Caesar, and Around the World in Eighty Days.64 
But creating a live adaptation of a new literary work each week 
was no easy task. As a general routine, Welles and Houseman would on 
Monday select a novel from a pool of previously designated source mat-
erial and begin the process of adapting it into a radio play.65 Though 
 
budget was nearly $850,000 in today’s dollars, adjusted for inflation. CPI 
Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=50%2C000 
&year1=1938&year2=2015 [https://perma.cc/H54Q-JJR4]. 
63. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 40–43; see also Heyer, supra note 57, at 46–47 
(noting that Welles’s series first served as a replacement for Cecil B. De Mille’s 
The Lux Radio Theatre series, then with the tenth episode it became a perm-
anent CBS show). 
64. The Radio Years, supra note 59, at 50–52; see also Heyer, supra note 57, 
at 45–71; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 40–43. 
65. “[T]he material was chosen by Welles and myself,” Houseman recalled in 
his memoirs, “on the basis of contrast and personal preference with occasional 
suggestions from the outside.” Houseman, supra note 12, at 180. H.G. Wells 
apparently granted CBS permission to adapt the War of the Worlds novel 
for radio, at least orally through his agent. See Orson Welles: Interviews 
7 (Mark W. Estrin ed., 2002) (H.G. Wells’ agent Jacques Chambrun stated 
that “In the name of Mr. H.G. Wells, I granted the Columbia Broadcasting 
System the right to dramatize Mr. H.G. Wells’s novel, The War of the Worlds, 
for one performance over the radio”). 
Welles later testified on some of his own memories (or lack thereof) about 
the process: 
Q. When was work started on the script? 
A. That I do not recollect. 
Q. Could you give an estimate as to a week before, 10 days before, 3 
days before? 
A. I can only estimate. 
Q. Give us an estimate. 
A. Probably a week. It might have been as much as three. It depended 
on our subjects. There was not a fixed system or a fixed schedule or 
length of time given for the preparation of any script. They averaged 
between five days and three weeks to prepare. . . . 
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Welles was the only one the Mercury promotional materials mentioned 
by name (“Welles writes, adapts, casts, directs, and acts in the great 
‘first person’ stories of literature for radio”),66 Houseman recalled that 
he was the one who would make the first effort at writing the adapt-
ation, “usually in bed, over a period of three to four days,” creating a 
draft script which the troupe would then use to perform a dry-run re-
hearsal in the studio, sans Welles.67 Welles would listen to this initial 
rehearsal’s recording and order changes, usually minor but sometimes 
substantial, and Houseman would incorporate the changes into the scri-
pt over the next few days.68 
At the end of this week of writing, Welles would arrive at the studio 
on Sunday around noon to lead the show’s formal dress rehearsal. It 
was then, in the words of his biographer Simon Callow, that “all hell 
broke loose.”69 “There was absolute chaos—absolute chaos, every week. 
Welles [was] a very destructive man, he ha[d] to destroy everything, 
then put it back together again himself, and there were endless passion-
ate discussions between him, Houseman and me,” recalled Paul Stewart, 
another vital Mercury collaborator.70 “Then suddenly someone would 
 
Q. When was the dress rehearsal generally for these Sunday shows? 
A. There was no general system. It varied considerably. This was 
because I was also at that time engaged in the running and directing 
of a theatre and the rehearsals of the radio show had to adapt them-
selves to our working schedule in the theatre. There therefore was no 
regular system. 
 Transcript, supra note 23, at 92–93, 104. 
66. See Broadcast Magazine 7 (Aug. 15, 1938); see also Callow, supra note 
60, at 370 (The epigraph for the series was “written, directed, produced and 
performed by Orson Welles”). 
67. Houseman, supra note 12, at 180–81; see also Callow, supra note 60, at 
376. According to Houseman:  
[The Welles-only billing] was one that I approved and encouraged. 
In the first place it was true: Mercury of the Air was Orson’s show. 
In the second, it was good showmanship and sound business to pub-
licize and exploit one dominant, magnetic personality. But its effect 
on our association and on the future course of the Mercury was deep 
and irreversible. From being Orson’s partner I was becoming a senior 
member of his staff.  
 Houseman, supra note 12, at 181. 
68. Callow, supra note 60, at 376–77. 
69. Id. at 377. 
70. Id. Stewart, a veteran radio actor and director, was heavily involved in struct-
uring the rehearsals and shepherding the show from conception to broadcast. 
Id. at 376. Stewart explained that he was needed because Welles was “a very 
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say ‘We‘re on the air in two minutes.’ The ground was strewn with 
paper. That we got on the air at all was a weekly miracle, because it 
was always like that.”71 
No matter the chaos, airtime came at 8 p.m. eastern each Sunday 
night. Not long after the on-air sign alit and the show was introduced, 
Welles’s deep baritone would intone the opening lines of the final 
script—final not necessarily by design but by the press of time. And 
atop a podium at the center of the studio, surrounded by his fellow 
actors, Welles would direct the show like he was conducting an orches-
tra. “[H]e waved his arms” and signaled “every music, sound and speech 
cue” from the first moment until the very last.72 
With the week’s show complete, Welles and Houseman, exhausted 
but exhilarated, would the next day, Monday, select another work to 
adapt, and the process began again.73 In Houseman’s succinct descrip-
tion, “It was a loose but viable collaboration and it worked with surpris-
ing efficiency.”74 
However, at the end of their first run of shows, Welles decided to 
deviate from this practiced routine. Perhaps testing whether he could, 
alone, do all of the feats for which he was getting credit, he insisted on 
scripting a show entirely by himself, an adaptation of the novel The 
Man Who Was Thursday.75 Because, when all was said and done, the 
 
poorly organised man,” and “Houseman, at least at the beginning, knew noth-
ing about radio and was of no use except in matters concerning the script—
few people better understood rewriting, reshaping or reworking a script.” Id.  
71. Id. at 377. 
72. Id. (quoting Richard Barr’s unpublished memoir). Houseman described 
Welles’s work on the day of the show as “a great victory snatched from the 
jaws of disaster . . . [f]or, what Orson accomplished each week in those eight 
terrible hours was extraordinary.” Houseman, supra note 12, at 191. 
73. See Houseman, supra note 12, at 181. This general Monday-to-Sunday time-
frame began with the tenth show, on September 11, 1938. Prior to that, 
the series aired on Monday nights. See Mercury Theatre of the Air: 
1938, http://www.mercurytheatre.info/mercurylog [https://perma.cc/ 
WN8T-VYLY]. 
74. Houseman, supra note 12, at 181. 
75. Callow, supra note 60, at 387. The Man Who Was Thursday aired on 
September 5, 1938. The Radio Years, supra note 59, at 51. Welles himself 
would later testify, however, that he worked on more than just that one 
script by himself: “For clarification I should say that on many occasions I 
wrote entire scripts in less than two days and completely rewrote scripts in 
less than one day.” Transcript, supra note 23, at 94. But see The Radio 
Years, supra note 59, at 16–17 (Houseman recalling in an interview from 
the 1980s that, although Welles had told Houseman that he would write 
The Man Who Was Thursday by himself, by the day before rehearsal he 
hadn’t written a word, so the two of them “patched it together as best we 
could by returning to the novel.”). Houseman, however, remembers Howard 
Koch working for the Mercury at this time even though Koch didn’t start 
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broadcast ran short of the normal one-hour running time—the announ-
cer had to fill the final minutes—Welles learned, or at least relearned, 
a valuable lesson.76 He couldn’t do everything himself. 
In light of this lesson, as well as the breakneck pace even when 
Houseman did the initial drafts, the two men decided by the fall of 1938 
that they needed someone who could dedicate himself exclusively to the 
scripts.77 As luck would have it, Houseman had recently met a young 
lawyer-turned-playwright named Howard Koch.78 Houseman had seen 
Koch’s first play, The Lonely Man, starring future Hollywood icon John 
 
until five shows later, calling into question his precise recollection of these 
events. Id. 
76. See Callow, supra note 60, at 387 (Houseman recalled that the ad-libbing 
at the end of the broadcast consisted of him “thrust[ing] various great novels 
into Welles’ hands” as “a trailer for future shows.”). But see The Mercury 
Theatre: The Man Who Was Thursday, CBS (Sept. 5, 1938) http://sounds. 
mercurytheatre.info/mercury/380905.mp3 (surviving audio of the broadcast 
includes only the announcer Dan Seymour seeming to fill time at the end). 
Welles ad-libbed a speech at the end of the Mercury’s second broadcast, 
Treasure Island, which Houseman may have been thinking of, at least in 
part. Callow, supra note 60, at 387; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 247 n.78. 
77. The strain upon Welles and Houseman in writing the radio shows was 
compounded greatly by their simultaneous Broadway endeavors, particularly 
since the preparations for their next stage production, Danton’s Death, were 
not going well. See Callow, supra note 60, at 389–98 (detailing the mounting 
challenges to Danton’s Death, including Welles forgetting the script in a taxi); 
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 59, 167–168 (“[Danton’s Death] died onstage after 
twenty-one performances, and it took the Mercury down with it.”); see also 
Houseman, supra note 12, at 190 (“[E]veryone was perpetually overworked. 
Shows were created week after week under conditions of soul- and health-
destroying pressure.”). 
78. Koch would later testify, when asked what prompted his career change, that 
“I found myself such a bad lawyer that on behalf of my clients I gave it up 
immediately.” Transcript, supra note 23, at 181. 
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Huston as Abraham Lincoln, and was impressed.79 Perhaps more im-
portantly, Koch, who had a wife and two children, was desperate for 
work.80 
Houseman hired Koch with Welles’s blessing in October 1938 at a 
weekly salary of $75.81 Koch’s first assignment was to adapt the histor-
ical novel Hell on Ice, which he did, at least in draft form, even before 
meeting Welles in person.82 As Koch later recalled with a mix of fond-
ness and awe: 
When I wrote my first of the radio plays for the Mercury Theatre 
on the Air—a real-life saga of misadventures in the Arctic called 
Hell on Ice—I still had not met Orson and was not at all certain 
of my tenure on the program. The day it was finished I had a call 
from a secretary to come to his office. My first impression of him 
was one of size; he seemed to fill the room. His gaze was penetrat-
ing, more than a look—it was also an appraisal. There was scarce-
ly any introduction, Orson having little time or patience for the 
amenities. In his hands he had my opened script and read aloud 
a line from one of the scenes, a poetic image that could be visual-
ized by a radio audience. His question was right to the point. “Is 
that a quote or is it your own line?” When I said I had written 
it, he made no comment, but I knew I was “in,” that Houseman’s 
 
79. The play imagined what Abraham Lincoln would think and do had he lived 
in the twentieth century. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 44; Howard Koch, 
Bard C. Archives & Special Collections, http://www.bard.edu/ 
archives/voices/koch/koch.php [http://perma.cc/C4HB-X6PT] (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2015). In Koch’s own words: 
Q. Going back to the fall of 1938, would you describe your first contact 
with the Mercury Theatre, with whom the contact was and how this 
arrangement came to be?  
A. Yes . . . I had written a play called ‘The Lonely Man,’ which 
was produced in Chicago with John Houston [sic]. And Mr. Welles or 
Mr. Houseman saw the play and liked it, and they were thinking of 
doing it on Broadway. 
And then one or two other Lincoln plays came in first, one being 
Robert Sherwood’s. 
So, they decided not to do it on Broadway, but they apparently 
read the play and when they wanted a writer for their programs—
as they were at first writing their own programs—they just found 
it too much to do with all the other production details—they 
apparently thought of me. And Mr. Houseman called me from 
Woodstock to New York to talk about it . . . . 
 Transcript, supra note 23 at 163.  
80. Houseman, supra note 12, at 190. 
81. Transcript, supra note 23, at 94. 
82. The Radio Years, supra note 59, at 29. 
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selection had been confirmed. I mention this incident to illustrate 
how Orson’s mind worked. Given a leaf, he saw the tree.83   
With his job secure, and fresh from the Hell on Ice broadcast’s 
success, Koch proceeded to script the Mercury’s next two shows, Seven-
teen and Around the World in Eighty Days, which aired on the 16th 
and 23rd of October, respectively.84 For his third assignment, the 
October 30th show, Koch was tasked with adapting a work he’d not 
previously read, a science fiction novel by H.G. Wells.85 
C. Second Conception: Wells to Welles 
“The War of the Worlds was a magic act, one of the world’s 
greatest, and Orson was the man to bring it off.” 
—John Houseman86 
 
83. Id. For more about the Mercury’s production of Hell on Ice, see Jacob 
Smith, Devil’s Symphony: Orson Welles’s Hell on Ice as Eco-Sonic Critique, 
Sounding Out! (Dec. 2, 2013), http://soundstudiesblog.com/2013/12/02/ 
devils-symphony-orson-welless-hell-on-ice-as-eco-sonic-critique/ [http://perma. 
cc/5G35-2ME6]. The piece refers to it as the broadcast that “radio enthusiasts 
routinely name as Welles’ best,” and also notes that its “proto-environmental 
critique” that has chilling (no pun intended) parallels with our current eco-crises. 
Id. 
Koch, after writing for The Mercury Theatre on the Air, went on to an illus-
trious career in television, theater, and Hollywood. His Welles v. CBS testi-
mony detailed his experience, particularly in film: 
Q. For the benefit of the Court, would you recount briefly your 
experience as a writer . . . ? 
A. I have spent most of my career as a writer in writing for films. And 
among the films that I have written or collaborated in writing have 
been ‘The Letter’ with Bette Davis; ‘Sergeant York,’ Gary Cooper, 
which I wrote with John Houston [sic]; ‘Casablanca,’ with Humphrey 
Bogart and Ingrid Bergman; ‘No Sad Songs For Me,’ Columbia 
Pictures, with Margaret Sullivan; ‘Letter From An Unknown Woman,’ 
which I wrote for Universal, with Joan Fontaine, Louis Jourdan; and 
perhaps a half dozen others during my Hollywood years. 
 Transcript, supra note 23, at 161–162.  
84. Mercury Theatre of the Air: 1938 (Aug. 24, 1998) http://www. 
mercurytheatre.info/mercurylog [http://perma.cc/D566-W8V3]; The Radio 
Years, supra note 59, at 29. Koch’s hiring, as he recounted in his memoirs, 
didn’t much change Welles and Houseman’s pace: “They considered sleep a 
luxury that, for the most part, they denied themselves as well as their staff.” 
Koch, supra note 12, at 3.  
85. Koch, supra note 12, at 3–5; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 45. 
86. Houseman, supra note 12, at 197. 
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For a month or more before that fateful night of October 30, 1938, 
Welles had been ruminating on a concept he wanted to introduce to 
the show: a fake news broadcast. Looking back, the previous month’s 
shows had seemingly been building up to the idea, both with Welles 
introducing the adaptation of John Drinkwater’s Abraham Lincoln as 
something that the audience “would recognize . . . much of it is news 
as if it were happening in the White House tonight,” as well as with 
the Mercury’s adaptation of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar employing a 
well-known CBS newsman as narrator and Welles, in his introductory 
remarks, noting the tale’s relevance to the dark events then transpiring 
in fascist Europe.87 
By the time of their October 30th show, the idea had taken full 
bloom. The Mercury Theatre on the Air would adapt The War of the 
Worlds as a simulated contemporary newscast.88 
1.  Orson Welles Testifies About the Broadcast’s Creation 
As Welles, under oath, would later testify: 
Q. Who conceived the original idea of this presentation? 
A. I did. 
Q. In such conception, did you collaborate with anyone else? I 
mean just in the conception. 
A. In the conception, no. I then explained it to people, who carried 
out my ideas, but the original conception was my own. 
* * * 
A. . . . I had conceived the idea of doing a radio broadcast in such 
a manner that a crisis would actually seem to be happening, and 
would be broadcast in such a dramatised89 form as to appear to 
be a real event taking place at that time, rather than a mere radio 
play. The final choice of the story to be used for this device was 
H. G. Wells’ ‘War of the Worlds’. I do not recollect whether that 
choice was mine or not. A number of different properties were 
discussed which might be used as a basis for this idea of mine.90 
 
87. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 51; Heyer, supra note 57, at 66–67. The 
newsman was H.V. Kaltenborn. Id. 
88. Heyer, supra note 57, at 66. 
89. The transcript, taken at the American Embassy in London, contains numerous 
British-style spellings such as this. See Transcript, supra note 23, at 70–71. 
90. Id. at 67 (reading the deposition of Orson Welles, July 8, 1960, into evidence 
at trial). Welles was, in years prior, apparently less generous in crediting 
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How did Welles come up with this idea to do a simulated news 
broadcast? Though not asked this question in his testimony, it’s clear 
that Welles did not conjure it from thin air. Responding to a reporter 
directly after the broadcast on whether he was “aware of the terror” it 
would cause, Welles remarked, “I’m terribly shocked by the effect it’s 
had. The technique I used was not original with me, or peculiar to the 
Mercury Theater’s presentation. It was not even new. I anticipated no-
thing unusual.”91 
When and where then did Welles hear this “technique” before? 
Media researchers have identified the most likely sources. The first, 
written by Father Ronald Knox and aired on January 16, 1926 by the 
British Broadcasting Company (BBC), was titled Broadcasting the 
Barricades. Listening to a broadcast of election returns, as Knox re-
called, “I endeavoured to visualise the breathlessness there would be 
throughout the country during a revolution, and I tried to imagine the 
news bulletins during such a time of popular excitement. I put my ideas 
on paper and then attempted to burlesque them.”92 In the process, Knox 
created what was likely history’s first fake news broadcast.93 
Knox began his show by reading a series of mock bulletins, include-
ing sports scores and a weather forecast, culminating in a report of an 
unruly mob of unemployed workers who systematically began attacking 
Parliament, Big Ben, and finally the BBC’s headquarters from where 
his character, William Donickson, was conducting the show.94 Broad-
casting the Barricades inspired some frightened responses, causing list-
eners to call the papers as well as the places that the mob supposedly 
attacked, despite the fact that soon after the broadcast the BBC 
announced, “London is Safe. Big Ben is still chiming, and all is well.”95 
Though it aired twelve years before the War of the Worlds broad-
cast, Houseman expressly recalled reading about Broadcasting the 
 
Koch’s work, including sending a telegram that read, in part, “Howard Koch 
did not write War of the Worlds.” Heyer, supra note 57, at 109. 
91. The Aftermath: Orson Welles “The War of the Worlds Halloween Press 
Conference,” 1938, Wellesnet.com (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.wellesnet. 
com/the-aftermath-orson-welles-the-war-of-the-worlds-halloween-press-
conference-1938/ [http://perma.cc/X3LY-5QM2]. See also Brady, supra 
note 3, at 173. 
92. Paul Slade, Holy Terror: The First Great Radio Hoax, PlanetSlade.com, 
http://www.planetslade.com/ronald-knox.html [http://perma.cc/3LQ8-ZD67] 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2015); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 53–58. 
93. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 53–58. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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Barricades in the newspapers, and years later Welles referred to a 
British broadcast from the twenties as a direct inspiration.96 
Welles’s other likely influence for the simulated news concept was 
more contemporary as well as closer to home. Playwright and fellow 
radio pioneer Archibald MacLeish had, prior to the War of the Worlds 
broadcast, written two shows for the Columbia Workshop, another CBS 
series that began two years before the Mercury Theatre on the Air.97 
For the Workshop’s April 11, 1936 episode, MacLeish penned The Fall 
of the City, a play written in poetic verse.98 Influenced by the Nazi 
annexation of Austria, MacLeish’s play took the form of a news broad-
cast from a plaza in an unnamed mythical city, announcing its citizens’ 
surrender to a conqueror who, it’s ultimately revealed, was just an 
empty suit of armor.99 The role of the narrator/announcer reporting on 
these events was voiced by none other than Welles himself.100 
A little over a year later, MacLeish wrote a similar poetic verse-
play for the Columbia Workshop, this time taking the form of a broad-
cast of an aerial attack on a small European village.101 Inspired by 
Franco’s bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War, Mac-
Leish’s Air Raid was broadcast on October 27, 1938, a mere three days 
before the Mercury’s performance of War of the Worlds.102 While the 
Mercury, at the start of that week, had already begun adapting The 
War of the Worlds as a fake news broadcast, MacLeish had been writing 
Air Raid for the previous seven months, and Welles had sat in on 
rehearsals for the show.103 Although Welles apparently never cited The 
 
96. Id. at 251 nn.45–46. 
97. Id. at 36–37. MacLeish led an eventful life outside of his radio work. FDR, 
for instance, nominated him to serve as the ninth Librarian of Congress,  
a position which he held from 1939 to 1944. Librarians of Congress, 
Jefferson’s Legacy, A Brief History of the Library of Congress, 
(Jan. 11, 2006) http://www.loc.gov/loc/legacy/librs.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HH7L-BV54]. Bob Dylan also figured in his story: MacLeish met and 
collaborated with him late in life. Bob Dylan, I Chronicles 107110 (2004). 
98. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 36; The Fall of the City, WNYC News (May 
3, 2009), http://www.wnyc.org/story/86853-the-fall-of-the-city/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QUL7-5RYN]. 
99. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 36 
100. Id. at 52. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. For the full script, see Archibald MacLeish, Air Raid (Oct. 27, 1938) 
(unpublished script) http://www.genericradio.com/objects/airraid19381027. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/2T5E-VWSP] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015). 
103. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 52. 
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Fall of the City or Air Raid as inspirations for the War of the Worlds 
broadcast, they couldn’t have been anything else.104 
So, looking back to both Welles’s testimony and the historical acc-
ounts, we see that his idea to describe The War of the Worlds’ Martian 
invasion as a contemporary news broadcast had several key influences. 
How then, specifically, was his idea executed? Welles, continuing 
his testimony, was asked to explain: 
A. [Mr. Koch’s] principal job was to cut and edit the mater-
ial . . . particularly with reference to the second half of the script, 
which adhered very closely to H. G. Wells. He was given the out-
lines of my ideas for the broadcast itself, or I assume he was given 
them, since I so instructed Mr. Houseman, and a script was pre-
sented to me which contained not only this dramatisation of the 
H. G. Wells material, but also the earlier material, which was 
more creative; that is, which owed nothing, in other words, to H. 
G. Wells.105 
Welles thought of the War of the Worlds script as two halves: the 
first written much more in the form of a fake news broadcast, which he 
considered to be “more creative” than the second half, which “adhered 
very closely” to the book.106 Asked to clarify this concept, Welles went 
on: 
A. . . . I am trying to explain that the script is divided into two 
sections, the first of which is almost entirely original, based only 
on the plot situation implied in the Wells story, and the second 
half of the script, which is an edited version of the H. G. Wells 
story was what I would call the non-creative part. It was an adap-
tation of Wells rather than being invention. That was the distinc-
tion I was trying to make.107 
To more fully explain how these two sections of the script came to 
be, Welles discussed Koch’s role in their creation: 
A. He worked on both, since he was one of those writers hired by 
myself to develop the ideas which I got for my show. 




105. Transcript, supra note 23, at 70.  
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 71. 
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A. I gave my ideas to Mr. Houseman and Mr. Stewart. How this 
was passed on to Mr. Koch, I am in no position to say.108 
Welles further testified that his next involvement with the script 
came once a “rough draft,” written by Koch, was presented to him.109 
Welles was asked how, from that draft, the script was molded into its 
final, on-air form. 
A. To the best of my recollection, the rough draft was dramatised, 
or perhaps it might be more accurate to say developed, in tech-
nical radio terms; that is, the use of interruptions, news broad-
casts, switch-overs from various radio stations and to mobile 
units. Information of this kind could not have been available to 
Mr. Koch and was, therefore, provided mainly by Mr. Stewart 
from his own technical experience. 
Q. To a certain extent is this what you refer to as “stage bus-
iness”? 
A. No; very much more actual text itself. This show purported to 
begin as a musical broadcast from an hotel. There was then an 
interruption with a piece of news. We then went back to the sta-
tion. There were then further interruptions. There was then the 
apparent use of newscasting techniques, the apparent use of am-
ateur radio channels, and so on. This whole system of devices, 
originally conceived by myself, was perfected in committee by all 
of the people working for myself on this broadcast, and finally 
revised and in considerable measure rewritten by myself, as the 
last stage.110 
Welles here described a highly collaborative process through which 
the simulated news idea was infused into the script—not just at its 
beginning, before Koch prepared the first draft, but throughout the 
writing process. 
Pressed ultimately to identify the person who wrote the final script 
that was used on the air, Welles replied: 
A. “My organisation,” is the correct answer. That included Mr. 
Koch, who did a great deal of work. I do not recollect any other 
writers whose only function was to write, but production assoc-
iates worked on the writing, as they did on other shows, and in 
 
108. Id. at 71–72. 
109. Id. at 69–70. Houseman was presumably the one who gave Welles the draft, 
though Welles was not asked who actually presented him with it. Id. 
110. Id. at 72–73.  
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this case rather more than usual, because the actual writing de-
pended on the use of radio techniques. 
Q. Did Paul Stewart take a part in that? 
A. Yes, Paul Stewart and others. How to apportion the contrib-
ution of these various people would be very difficult to say in 
exact percentages, but it was a collaborative effort, which was 
commenced and then concluded by myself.111 
“A collaborative effort . . . commenced and then concluded by my-
self,” was how Orson Welles then, in the final analysis, described the 
creation of the War of the Worlds radio play. Starting with an idea 
conceived by him, communicated to his collaborators, developed by his 
organization (comprised of Welles, Koch, Houseman, Stewart, and oth-
ers), and performed on the air by Welles and his fellow voice actors. 
2.  Howard Koch Testifies About Writing the Script. 
Howard Koch, on the other hand, did not remember the War of the 
Worlds radio play—at least its script—as such a collaborative effort. 
Asked under oath whether he wrote it “alone or in collaboration with 
anyone else,” Koch testified: 
A. Alone, as far as being a writer was concerned. As you know, 
there are always relationships with the producer, sometimes with 
the director and a sort of supervising relationship. And in this 
case . . . it was with Mr. Houseman who came up to my apart-
ment at various times and would talk over various parts of the 
script as it was progressing. 
Q. Did you have any contact with Mr. Welles about this partic-
ular script? 
A. I had no contact with Mr. Welles during that—during the 
writing of the script, that I can recall. As nearly as I can remem-
ber, I saw him only at the dress rehearsals at the studio, and then 
very briefly. 
Q. You received your instructions from his associate; Mr. House-
man; is that correct? 
A. Yes.112 
 
111. Id. at 73. 
112. Id. at 147 (reading deposition of Howard Koch, July 6, 1960, into evidence 
at trial). Expounding on his relationship with Houseman, and the suggestions 
Houseman communicated, Koch explained: 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
An Idea of Authorship 
731 
However, in describing Houseman’s instructions, particularly those 
given to him before he began writing, Koch made it clear that the idea 
behind the script was not his own: 
A. After I had finished the second week, and they wanted to con-
tinue the relationship, Mr. Houseman told me that the next one 
they wanted to do would be based upon H. G. Wells’ ‘The War 
of the Worlds.’ He asked me to read it, the story. I did. 
He then told me that they wanted to do it in an entirely different 
way from the way the story was written. They wanted to do it as 
a series of radio broadcasts involving the present invasion of the 
Martians. And, outside of this, I was free to go my own way. But 
this was a stipulation. 
I considered this for a few hours, and I remember calling him back 
and saying that I didn’t think this could be done in a week. It 
was just too much of an original job. I could get very little out of 
the story in this particular—if we are going to do it in this part-
icular form. 
Mr. Houseman then went back and talked to Mr. Welles. He call-
ed me back and said that Mr. Welles insisted that we should go 
ahead on this, because he very much wanted to do it. 
So, I started—I started the script immediately after that.113 
So, though Koch didn’t know at that time whether the idea came 
from Welles, or from Welles and Houseman together, Houseman made 
it clear that Koch was to adapt The War of the Worlds into a series of 
 
Q. When Houseman would drop by when you were working on this 
script, what sort of suggestions would he make, if you can remem-
ber? . . . 
A. . . . I’d say their nature would be such as, ‘I think that you can 
get more out of this scene; I think this is too long here; I suggest 
that we bring in another character here; I don’t think this will hold 
so long; I think you can get a little more color into this broad-
cast.’ . . . 
Q. Would you say, then, that these were, in effect, criticisms and hav-
ing heard the criticisms you would continue writing or make changes? 
A. Yes, sir, if I agreed with the criticisms, I would make the changes. 
If I disagreed with them, we would talk it out. 
Q. Did he contribute anything in the sense of writing; in other words, 
dialogue or characters? 
A. No, he was always very careful, Mr. Houseman, not to do that. He 
wanted it to retain the original flavor of the author. 
Id. at 165–66.  
113. Id. at 165. 
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radio bulletins describing the invasion as if it were happening in real-
time. Moreover, Koch’s first reaction after reading the book was that 
he could not do the work in a week if it was to be done in this new, 
fake-news form. He only began to write once Houseman made it clear 
that Welles insisted he go forward in the fashion prescribed. 
With respect to how he went about adapting the book in the fashion 
in which Welles insisted, Koch was asked: 
Q. Could you state how much of the material was actually taken 
from the book, percentagewise? 
A. It’s awfully hard to say. Because, for instance, I remember 
taking in the first part the description of the Martians, as I des-
cribed them in it. You know, the business of the script, I described 
them as Mr. Wells—H. G. Wells—described them. And that was 
about all I can remember in Part I. 
Well, the description of the machines, too. In other words, the 
physical descriptions, I went to as much as possible. 
But the form in which I was doing this was so entirely different 
from Mr. Wells’ story form, it made it practically an original 
script. 
In Part II, there was an encounter between Prof. Pearson [sic] 
and a survivor that I think I took quite a good deal of that scene 
from H. G. Wells’ story. And perhaps some other descriptions 
from that section of the story which was near the end. This was 
about the last quarter of the script. 
Let’s say, all together, that somewhere around one-fifth or one-
tenth might have been taken from the original.114 
 
114. Id. at 151–52. Koch also, in his memory, provided the announcer cues and 
other radio effects, with no major changes made after he turned in the 
script. Id. at 159. Welles, for his part, recalled things somewhat differently: 
Q. Did this script have the sound effects written in, to your memory? 
A. A writer often indicates sound effects, although there were only 
a few radio writers capable of being helpful in that direction. We did 
not actively discourage the writing of these directions, although we 
found them useless. 
Q. Did it have the various dialogue to be spoken by the various 
characters so indicated? 
A. Did it have the dialogue? Yes; that is the definition of a script. 
Q. So referring now to the script which we have here—I think there 
is a copy in front of you—for instance down near the bottom of page 
1 it says: ‘Announcer cue:’, and then another voice breaks in ‘. . . for 
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Koch’s description of what he took from the H.G. Wells book, and 
how much he thought was different, is very telling. “The form in which 
I was doing this was so entirely different from Mr. Wells’ story form, it 
made it practically an original script,” Koch testified, demonstrating 
his view that the news-bulletin format, conceived and insisted on by 
Orson Welles, was what led to the creation of material that was dis-
tinctly original from the book. 
Despite their divergent recollections about how much Welles part-
icipated in the scriptwriting—according to Welles, much, according to 
Koch, none—one central point went without dispute. Orson Welles 
came up with the idea to adapt The War of the Worlds into a series of 
fake news bulletins, he then communicated it to John Houseman, who 
then communicated it to Howard Koch, who used this idea to script an 
original adaptation of H.G. Wells’ novel for radio. The rest, heard on 
radios across America that night before Halloween, 1938, was history. 
D. Creative Litigation: Welles v. CBS 
The Mercury’s War of the Worlds broadcast—the ground-breaking 
style, the public reaction, the media sensation—has continued to grip 
our imaginations, not just in America but around the world.115 Much 
less remembered, however, is Orson Welles’s battle for co-ownership 
and control of its copyright. Although a complete history of the Welles 
litigation would not suit our purposes here, some brief background on 
his claims and the courts’ rulings will aid our ensuing look at idea-
contribution and joint authorship, helping us understand both why  
the next twenty four hours not much change in temperature’. Was 
that sort of thing in the script? 
A. Some of it. Much of it incorrectly in the script. There was an effort 
by Mr. Koch to indicate this, but owing to his lack of knowledge of 
radio procedure (that is not radio writing indicating horses’ hooves, 
and so on, but radio procedure particularly called for in the script) I 
remember that most of his indications were useless to us. 
* * *  
Q. . . . So would it be fair to say in this script that he turned in we 
would have the break from one type of broadcast to the other, then 
back to the hotel and then over to the newsflash? 
A. Some of these were indicated as used in the show, but only some. 
Q. Then you made some additions and changes? 
A. I rewrote a great section. This was my normal procedure with all 
scripts and does not cast any reflection on Mr. Koch. He probably 
forgets that system of work which pertained at that time. 
Id. at 104–06 (reading deposition of Orson Welles, July 8, 1960, into evidence 
at trial). 
115. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 220–29. 
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Welles lost his bid for a share in the copyright as well as how we might 
view things differently today. 
1. Welles’s Claims 
Almost twenty years after The War of the Worlds first blazed across 
the airwaves, television had overtaken radio as the news and entertain-
ment epicenter of American life. CBS, the former patron of Welles’s 
radio work, decided that it wanted to do a “docudrama” about the 
public’s frightened reaction to the radio broadcast, and so it produced 
the movie The Night America Trembled.116 Televised in 1957, it include-
ed scenes depicting the Mercury actors reading lines from the script, 
intercut with mock footage of a terror-stricken audience.117 
A few months before The Night America Trembled aired, CBS had 
reached out to offer Welles an acting part in it. Welles, believing he 
controlled the rights to the War of the Worlds broadcast, replied with 
a demand that he write and direct it instead.118 CBS had already reach-
ed an agreement with Howard Koch, however, granting it the right to 
use the script in the movie, and so CBS proceeded without Welles’s 
involvement or permission.119 
Welles sued on September 8, 1959, in California state court, and 
CBS quickly removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California, Judge Leon R. Yankwich presiding.120  
116. Id. at 206. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. As Welles would later explain:  
I was sure a serious mistake had been made by CBS, and that, on a 
moment’s reflection, they would see that they did not have a right 
to make a telecast either based on my production or dealing with it 
without not only my permission, but my creative collaboration. I 
offered my services in a creative capacity as an alternative to playing 
a role in this show; in other words, I offered to write and produce the 
show for them or, at the very least, to prepare a treatment of what 
such a show might be. 
Transcript, supra note 23, at 81. 
119. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 206. 
120. Transcript, supra note 23, at 3–5; Welles v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 308 F.2d 
810 (9th Cir. 1962). Welles also named Westinghouse, the corporate sponsor 
of The Night America Trembled, as a defendant in the action. Welles, 308 
F.2d at 811. “Removal” is the procedural mechanism by which defendants 
can automatically transfer a case from a state court to a federal court because 
the plaintiff’s claims arise under federal law or there is a diversity of citizenship 
between the parties and the amount in controversy is sufficiently high. 14B 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 3721 (4th ed. 2015). This second reason, known as federal 
“diversity jurisdiction,” was the mechanism by which the defendants here 
removed the case to federal court. Welles, 308 F.2d at 811. Welles was a 
resident of Rome, Italy while CBS and Westinghouse had their corporate 
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A Romanian-born Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointee and U.S. Army 
veteran of the First World War, Judge Yankwich had also built a for-
midable reputation as an intellectual property scholar, deciding import-
ant Hollywood cases and publishing articles on the subject in the 
University of Chicago’s and University of Southern California’s law 
reviews.121 
Most notably, Judge Yankwich was the first to apply the now com-
monly used term “scènes à faire” (i.e., “scenes which must be done”) to 
the copyright doctrine which says that where certain elements are 
indispensable, or at least standard, in expressing a particular idea (e.g., 
using the elements of a craft flying through space to express the idea of 
invading aliens), those expressive elements are as unprotectable as the 
idea.122 Given Judge Yankwich’s knowledge of the field as well as his 
skepticism toward the protection of ideas, Welles could not have found 
a much tougher audience for what was, ultimately, a novel series of 
claims. 
In the first of these claims, Welles alleged that because he “conceiv-
ed, originated, devised, [and] created [the] style” of the War of the 
Worlds broadcast, he was its “co-author and proprietor.”123 As such, 
Welles asserted that he was the “proprietor of the entire right, title and 
interest in and to” the broadcast, “together with common law copy-
rights and of all rights and privileges secured thereby” and that CBS 
had infringed his copyright because The Night America Trembled used 
a portion of the War of the Worlds script without his permission.124 
Welles’s two other claims centered on his previous contractual 
relationship with CBS as head of The Mercury Theatre on the Air. 
Specifically, Welles alleged in his second claim that CBS had breached 
an implied term of his radio contract that required his permission if  
places of residence in New York and Pennsylvania, respectively. Transcript, 
supra note 23, at 4. Welles was seeking a total of $425,000 in damages, easily 
exceeding the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement (the present-day 
requirement is $75,000). Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
121. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Yankwich, Leon Rene, Fed. 
Jud. Ctr. http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2670&cid=999&ctype 
=na&instate=na [perma.cc/3CS7-HVKZ]; Leon R. Yankwich, What Is Fair 
Use?, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1954); Leon R. Yankwich, Intent and Related 
Problems in Plagiarism, 33 S. Cal. L. Rev. 233 (1960). For an article Judge 
Yankwich wrote that dealt extensively with originality and ideas in copyright, 
see Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, supra note 25. 
122. Nimmer, supra note 15, at § 13.03[B][4] (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Peter Decherney, Hollywood’s Copyright Wars: From Edison to 
the Internet 86–87 (2012) (detailing Judge Yankwich’s involvement in 
the case of Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942), 
in which he first used the term “scènes à faire”). 
123. Transcript, supra note 23, at 22. 
124. Id. at 22–23. 
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CBS wanted to use any of the shows directed and produced by Welles.125 
In his third and final claim, Welles alleged that another implied term 
in his CBS contract was that CBS must grant him the first opportunity 
to serve as “producer, director and consultant” on any “production, 
adaptation or revision” of the shows he produced for CBS, including 
the War of the Worlds broadcast.126 
 2. Trial and Appeal 
The only testimony taken in the case was that of two former mem-
bers of The Mercury Theater on the Air—Welles himself, in a July 8, 
1960 deposition at the American Embassy in London, and Howard 
Koch, at a deposition taken a month earlier in New York City (testi-
mony which, in relevant part, was quoted above).127 The parties agreed 
to try the case before the judge, not a jury, and also agreed to simply 
read the depositions into evidence at the trial as opposed to calling live 
witnesses.128 
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Yankwich told the parties that 
they didn’t have to wait for his decision, and, in announcing his ruling 
from the bench, he quickly disposed of Welles’s second and third claims, 
explaining that the nature and language of Welles and CBS’s contract 
did not support the broad implied terms that Welles ascribed to it.129 
In other words, CBS would not, without expressly stating it in the 
contract, have given Welles the perpetual right to control what CBS 
did with any show he had produced.130 
So, as Judge Yankwich remarked from the bench, “[i]t seems  
. . . that the whole matter here turns upon the copyright.”131 Yankwich 
discounted Welles’s testimony about his heavy involvement in writing 
the script—believing Koch’s version of events instead—but he gave 
Welles credit for conceiving the idea behind it.132 This conception, how-
ever, because it was merely an idea, could give Welles no copyright in 
the War of the Worlds radio play. “The working out of the idea is in 
the script,” the Judge informed the parties, “[t]here is no right in an 
idea.”133 
 
125. Id. at 24. 
126. Id. at 25. 
127. See supra Part II.C. 
128. See supra Part II.C. 
129. Transcript, supra note 23, at 198. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 199. 
132. Id. at 206. 
133. Id. at 202. Note that, because Welles, in his pleadings, only claimed co-
authorship, not sole authorship, the court may well have been able to resolve 
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Cementing this ruling, Judge Yankwich issued his written Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 4, 1961, which firmly stated, 
“Although plaintiff made some minor changes and modifications in said 
script after it had been completed by Howard Koch, plaintiff was nei-
ther author nor a co-author thereof.”134 
 
the case without deciding whether Welles was in fact an author of the 
broadcast or not. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. Further, most 
likely because Welles’s attorney raised the issue at trial, the court found also 
that CBS did not engage in unfair competition with Welles, because there 
was no risk that an audience would have confused the actors and reading 
the script on The Night America Trembled with Welles’ own original perform-
ance on the radio. Transcript, supra note 23, at 43. 
 The court further found that Welles had abandoned whatever copyright he 
had in the script based on Welles’s decision not to sue when Koch had 
earlier licensed the script for use in Hadley Cantril’s book The Invasion from 
Mars, which studied the panic resulting from the broadcast and the reasons 
behind it. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not reach this issue on appeal—perhaps 
because, at least under Welles’ theory that he was a co-author of the work 
along with Koch, it would be strange to find that his failure to sue his co-
author for a prior use of the work would constitute abandonment. See generally 
Welles v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 308 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962) (describing 
the court’s reasoning and conclusions of law). Note, however, that Welles’s 
failure to contest Koch authorizing Cantril’s publisher, the Princeton Press, 
to register the copyright in its name, presumably for Koch’s benefit, could 
have started the statute of limitations running on any claim Welles would 
have had against Koch. Id. 
 Last, although Judge Yankwich did not include it as a basis for his ruling in 
his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Ninth Circuit discussed 
Koch’s assertion that John Houseman, implicitly on behalf of Welles, told 
Koch that he would have full copyright ownership in all of the scripts that 
he wrote for The Mercury Theatre on the Air—an agreement that, if enforce-
able against Welles, would have made Koch the sole legal owner of the War 
of the Worlds radio play’s copyright regardless of whether Welles was its 
coauthor. Welles, 308 F.2d at 813 (“[It] clearly appears . . . from Koch’s 
deposition, that Koch dealt with one Houseman entirely and that the arran-
gement with Houseman was that, after a limited time, in view of the small 
fee paid Koch for writing the script all rights in the script would belong to 
Koch and not to appellant Welles.”). 
 The biggest problem with Koch’s assertion there is that, to be legally enforce-
able, such an agreement would likely have had to be in writing. See Nimmer, 
supra note 16, at § 10.03(A)(1)(a) (citing Section 28 of the 1909 Act, which 
required that a complete assignment of copyright in a work must be in 
writing). Koch apparently never asked for or received anything on this in 
writing. See Transcript, supra note 23, at 149 (“Q. In your employment by 
the Mercury Theatre, were you employed by written contract? A. I believe 
not. I have looked it up in my records and could find none.”). 
134. See Welles, 308 F.2d at 812 n.1. 
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Welles appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit, which issued its 
decision on October 3, 1962, affirming the trial court’s decision.135 Most 
pointedly, the Ninth Circuit recited the general rule that “ideas per se 
are not copyrightable, but that the words or means of embodiment or 
expression of those ideas are,” a rule which the Ninth Circuit noted was 
determinative of Welles’s copyright claim.136 Welles thus recovered no-
thing from his case against CBS. 
A much more far-reaching consequence of Welles’s failed suit, how-
ever, was the cementing of Howard Koch’s legal status as the broad-
cast’s sole author. Ever since the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, Howard Koch 
has been the only member of the Mercury Theatre on the Air to profit 
from the copyright in the War of the Worlds.137 Koch’s descendants, 
since his death in 1995, continue to receive royalties from anyone who 
wants to rebroadcast, perform, or adapt the radio play.138 Welles and 
his descendants have received nothing.139 
III. Recognizing Idea-Contributors as Joint Authors 
Orson Welles, as Martin Scorsese has perceptively observed, was an 
iconoclast.140 Whether it was film, theater, or radio, he blatantly bucked 
convention, fighting to bend the systems in which he worked to his own 
vision. So too then, in his suit against CBS, Welles tried to bend the 
law to his vision of what it should be—a vision that he, as co-author 
and “proprietor” of the War of the Worlds broadcast, had the right to 
 
135. Id. at 810. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court based on only a certain 
few of its conclusions of law. Id. at 814 (“Our rulings on Conclusions of Law 
Nos. 1, 3, 8 and 9 are determinative of the merits of this case, and it will 
therefore be unnecessary to pass upon the others.”). 
136. Id. at 814. 
137. Koch, supra note 12, at 8 (“[T]he copyright of my War of the Words radio 
play is in my name with the various benefits that have since accrued”). 
138. For example, in 2003, Howard Koch’s widow sued Clear Channel Communic-
ations, XM Satellite Radio, and Glenn Beck for copyright infringement as a 
result of the defendants’ unauthorized use of the War of the Worlds radio 
play, “with Glenn Beck in the Orson Welles role.” See Permanent Injunction, 
Koch v. Clear Channel Comm’ns, Inc., No. CV03-03430-NM(PJWx) (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 1, 2003). The parties settled for an undisclosed amount. See id. 
139. Welles died in 1985 and was survived by his partner, Oja Kodar, and 
several children. Linda Christmas, In My Father’s Shadow: A Daughter 
Remembers Orson Welles by Chris Welles Feder: Review, Telegraph 
(Feb. 1, 2010, 6:20 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/book 
reviews/7094071/In-My-Fathers-Shadow-a-Daughter-Remembers-Orson-
Welles-by-Chris-Welles-Feder-review.html [http://perma.cc/6M27-HTLR].  
140. A Personal Journey with Martin Scorsese Through American 
Movies (British Film Institute 1998). 
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dictate whether and how CBS used it, despite the fact that CBS had 
already acquired that right from his co-author Howard Koch.141 
That Welles ultimately failed in this attempt should come as no 
real surprise—a co-author cannot block another co-author from licens-
ing a copyrighted work, nor can he stop the licensee from using it.142 He 
has only the right to demand from his co-author an equal share of the 
profits.143 And had the courts who heard Welles’s suit decided it on that 
ground, and that ground alone, there could be little complaint with 
their ruling. In hindsight, Judge Yankwich likely should have dismissed 
the case against CBS and told Welles that, assuming he had any rights 
in the War of the Worlds radio play, his only recourse was to sue Mr. 
Koch for a share of the proceeds. 
Instead, the trial and appellate courts decided to expound on whe-
ther Welles was a co-author at all. And in so doing, they infused their 
rulings with the same problem that continues to plague the courts 
today—the misconception that because an idea standing alone is un-
copyrightable, it must follow that a person who contributes only ideas 
cannot be a joint author in a collaborative copyrighted work. 
Let’s examine, first, why this is a misconception and why we should 
dispel it. 
A. Why We Should Recognize Idea-Contributors 
1. An Author is More Than an Expressionist 
Courts, as we saw earlier, have largely defined an “author” as an 
expressionist: a person “who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible  
141. Welles’s vision of what his rights in the War of the Worlds broadcast should 
have been were perhaps influenced by continental Europe’s recognition of the 
“moral rights” of an author, particularly given Welles’s affinity for Europe 
and the fact that he was living in Rome at the time of his suit against CBS. 
See supra notes 117–125 and accompanying text. See generally, ROBERTA 
KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR 
THE UNITED STATES (2010); Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, in Landmark 
Intellectual Property Cases and Their Legacy 13, 13–32 (Christopher 
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011) (explaining moral rights in 
intellectual property). 
142. This is true under the current Copyright Act as well as the 1909 Act that 
governed the Welles case. Nimmer, supra note 16, at § 6.10(A)(2)(a) (citing 
Geshwind v. Garrick, 734 F. Supp. 644, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d mem., 
927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991) and Meredith v. Smith, 145 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 
1944)). But this is true only with respect to a co-author’s granting of a non-
exclusive license. Id. at § 6.10(A)(2)(b). An exclusive license (without a con-
comitant license from the other co-authors) would effectively block other 
co-authors from licensing the work, defeating the purpose of the rule. Id. at 
§ 6.10(A)(2)(d).  
143. See id. at § 6.10(A)(1)(b) (explaining that joint owners may each make use 
of the copyrighted work, but must account to all other joint owners for any 
resulting profits). 
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expression entitled to copyright protection.”144 And because the Copy-
right Act’s definition of “joint work” speaks of “a work prepared by two 
or more authors,” courts have denied joint authorship to idea-contrib-
utors on the basis of this definition of “author.”145 In other words, if an 
author is someone who expresses an idea in a fixed, tangible medium, 
a person who contributes only intangible ideas cannot be an author. 
The premise—one must be an author to be a joint author—is cor-
rect, but is the definition? Before delving into the statutory language, 
we should begin with the document that provides the Copyright Act’s 
underlying legal authority, the U.S. Constitution, and the Constitu-
tion’s use of the word “authors,” for the basic reason that even if idea-
contributors can qualify as joint authors under the Act, if the Consti-
tution doesn’t permit it, the case is already closed.146 
The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies.”147 As noted above, courts have largely declined to rely on this lang-
uage to deny idea-contributors copyright joint authorship, apparently 
because no court has seriously questioned the constitutionality of the 
Copyright Act’s work-for-hire provisions—provisions which recognize 
an employer as the “author” of an employee’s copyrightable creations 
even where the employer has creatively contributed nothing to the 
work, much less an idea. In other words, if we presume that the work-
for-hire doctrine is constitutional, then we can’t say with a straight face 
that the Constitution bars idea-contributors from joint authorship. 
However, even if one thinks the work-for-hire doctrine unconstitu-
tional—that is, that recognizing non-creative contributors as “authors” 
stretches the Constitution’s language past the breaking point—I don’t 
believe that recognizing idea-contributors suffers from the same infirm-
ity.148 The question is whether the combination of the word “authors” 
 
144. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
146. See U.S. Const. art. 6 (cementing the supremacy of the Constitution over 
all other federal or state law). 
147. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
148. See 2 Patry, supra note 34, at § 3:18 (describing some possible connotations 
of the term “authors” in the Constitution: 
Although the Constitution refers to “authors,” the term is not defined 
and has at least three possible connotations. The first is those individ-
uals or entities that may qualify as authors. Congress could, for 
example, decide that only individuals, and not juridical entities, should 
be authors, or that juridical entities can be authors only in certain 
circumstances. Second, “author” could be merely an instrumental term, 
denoting the initial owner of all rights in a protected work. Under this 
view, there is no constitutional import to the term “author” so long 
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with the words “their . . . writings” prevents an idea-contributor who 
doesn’t put her idea into writing from constitutionally qualifying for 
authorship. In my view, the answer is no. The premise behind recogni-
zing an idea-contributor as a joint author, as detailed in this Article, is 
that in contributing her ideas she is working together with a person 
who is physically putting pen to paper, such that the final product—
the writing—owes its existence to the combination of two (or more) 
creative contributions. If the writing would not have existed in its final 
form but for the input of the idea-contributor, then I think we can 
readily—and constitutionally—say that the “writing” is that of multiple 
“authors,” one of whom is the idea-contributor. And again, as explained 
above, we are not giving the idea-contributor ownership of her idea. We 
are simply giving her joint authorship—and thus co-ownership—of the 
writing that owes part of its existence to her. 
Next, let’s return to the meaning of the term “authors” in the Copy-
right Act, most specifically whether the Act requires fixation to be an 
author. The Act tells us that “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium 
of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or 
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”149 This language presupposes 
that a work can exist, and be authored, prior to fixation, a presuppo-
sition which makes sense—the fact that a piece of improvised jazz music 
performed live and without recording equipment has not been fixed 
doesn’t mean that the musicians are not authors or that there is no 
work. The work simply hasn’t been fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression.150 
 
as an original work has been created, Congress is free to assign initial 
ownership as it sees fit. 
The final connotation of “authors” is that it refers to things authors 
do—acts that may be said to involve “authorship.” Under this conno-
tation, authors are not determined by who they are but by what they 
do. As we shall see, this connotation of author is synonymous with 
“originality”: authors are those who create original works.). 
 Additionally, other scholars have noted that Congress’ separate constitutional 
power to regulate interstate commerce arguably provides a basis for the 
protection of unoriginality via copyright. E.g., Michael B. Gerdes, Getting 
Beyond Constitutionally Mandated Originality As A Prerequisite for Federal 
Copyright Protection, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1461, 1464 (1992) (“The Court, 
however, is mistaken in its implication that Congress lacks power to grant 
federal copyright protection for non-original works. Congress could grant 
such protection pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce.”).  
149. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
150. See Lape, supra note 37, at 65–74; VerSteeg, supra note 40, at 1347–64 
(detailing why authorship is not dependent on fixation). But where I go beyond 
VerSteeg is the recognition that an author is also more than someone who 
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Now, the Act also defines when a work is “created,” specifying that 
it’s when “it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time.”151 This 
definition could indicate that there is no work before fixation, and thus 
no authorship before fixation. But the definition, read more properly in 
my view, simply assigns an exact time of creation for purposes of the 
Act’s protections. It strains reality to say that an improvised jazz piece 
was not created when it was played for the first time, live, in front of 
an audience. It simply doesn’t receive protection under the Act—and 
thus is not “created” for purposes of the Act—until it’s fixed. 
Professor Paul Goldstein, in his eminent treatise Goldstein on 
Copyright, asserts that the Act’s use of the term “authors” in its defin-
ition of a joint work implies that each such author must contribute a 
“work of authorship” as that term is used in Section 102 of the Act.152 
This, in turn, necessarily means that in Goldstein’s view each such 
“work of authorship” must be copyrightable by itself. 
But the term “works of authorship” in Section 102 is preceded by 
the term “original” and followed by the language “fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”153 Thus, I think the better reading is that the 
phrase “works of authorship,” or more specifically the word “author-
ship,” does not imply independent copyrightability. Instead, the sur-
rounding language indicates that “authorship” can be both unoriginal 
and unfixed. Otherwise, the language surrounding “authorship” would 
be redundant and unnecessary. 
Again, practically speaking, this should make sense. An improvised, 
live, unrecorded jazz piece is a work of authorship, just not one that’s 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Originality is a more compli-
cated concept, but similarly, authorship can be, at least in part, unorig-
inal, in that it can (and typically does) incorporate original and un-
original components.154 
 
uses a stenographer. See infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text. He holds 
back from that final step to which his full and enlightening explanation of the 
meaning of the word “author” naturally should lead. VerSteeg, supra note 
40, at 1347–65. 
151. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
152. 1 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 4.2.1.2 (3d ed. 2009). 
153. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression . . . .”). 
154. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 
1507 (2009) (proposing a copyright scheme that protects “highly original” 
works more than “minimally original works”); Theo Austin Bruton, Mind-
Movies: Original Authorship as Applied to Works from “Mind-Reading” 
Neurotechnology, 14 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 263, 270–272 (2014) 
(discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of originality). 
To be clear, a work that has zero originality, such as a photocopy, is not a 
work of authorship at all. There is no authorship in the end product, so no 
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Consider an artist who paints a replica of a painting in the 
Louvre.155 The only authorship enforceable against a third party in that 
replica is the original expression added by the author (e.g., the pattern 
of the brush strokes, a deviation in the colors used, etc.).156 This doesn’t 
mean that the rest of the painting—the unoriginal expression—is not a 
part of the author’s authorship. The overall work of authorship is the 
sum of both the original and unoriginal components. 
To further illustrate, let’s say that two artists are creating, to-
gether, a new painting that borrows from two existing paintings in the 
Louvre. Each one’s input is, standing alone, unoriginal, but the comb-
ination (or transposition) of both of their unoriginal copying of the two 
existing works is, as a whole, an original and protectable copyrighted 
work. Neither artist has, alone, contributed original expression. Does 
that make neither of them authors? I believe the answer is no, and it 
demonstrates that the word “original” is not a redundant part of the 
statute.157 
Authorship involves much that, by itself, would not constitute 
protectable authorship. A book’s authorship involves ideas, which stan-
ding alone, would not constitute authorship, as well as unoriginal ex-
pression, which on its own, would not constitute authorship. But do we 
deny that these things, especially the ideas that formed the genesis of 
the book, are a part of the book’s authorship? I don’t believe we do. 
We simply deny protection as against third parties to any part of the 
book that is unoriginal or unfixed. 
The key is that the combination of all of these elements—ideas and 
expression, both original and unoriginal—results in a final, fixed work 
of authorship that has some originality. In this way, originality and 
 
part of it can be authorship. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 362–64 (1991) (holding that an alphabetized collection of names 
and telephone numbers lacked originality). 
155. See David McCullough, The Greater Journey: Americans in Paris 
61–101 (2011) (describing the tradition of painting in the Louvre). 
156. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity [for 
copyright] is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative 
spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”) (quoting 1 
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.08 
[C][1] (2015)). 
157. This is similar to the situation encountered by Judge Posner in Gaiman v. 
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 39, and 
I think it demonstrates that his logic in that case should not just be limited 
to cases of multiple contributors in which none of them have made indepen-
dently copyrightable contributions. Gaiman is not an exception to the rule 
that “authorship” equals an independently copyrightable contribution; it is an 
example that proves (what should be) the rule that “authorship” need not 
be independently copyrightable in the joint authorship context. 
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fixation should—and by proper application of the statutory language 
are—required when we’re evaluating the copyrightability of a work as 
a whole, or when we’re judging what is protectable as against third 
parties, but not when we’re determining authorship. 
The language of the Copyright Act shows, then, that authorship 
can be either unoriginal or unfixed, or both, and if so, it isn’t—standing 
alone—subject to federal copyright protection.158 But unoriginal or un-
fixed authorship that, when combined with another’s fixed expression, 
creates an original, fixed work is (and should be recognized as) author-
ship that contributes to a copyrightable work.159 And the contribution 
of such authorship—an idea for instance, such as the idea to adapt The 
War of the Worlds as a series of fake news bulletins—should thus qual-
ify someone as one of the “authors” of a joint work under the language 
of the Copyright Act. 
The above reading of the Copyright Act is of course merely my 
own, aided by principles of statutory construction and the analysis of 
other commentators. I don’t claim that it’s the only reasonable reading 
of the text. Though I believe the better reading of “authorship” is that 
it precedes and is separate from fixed expression, the meaning of 
“authors” and “authorship” is ultimately—absent a firm, express stat-
utory definition—the subject of reasonable debate. This is particularly 
true given that the Copyright Act’s legislative history is essentially 
silent on the issue.160 
 
158. Unfixed expression has traditionally been the domain of common law copy-
right protection, which varies state by state. Nimmer, supra note 16, at 
§ 2.02; see also Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 
250, 255 (N.Y. 1968) (containing a notable early discussion of whether oral 
statements qualify for common law copyright protection). For an amusing 
anecdote from Orson Welles regarding his relationship with Ernest Hemingway, 
see Orson Welles on Hemingway, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=NyTi9v9QPxE. 
159. If two people are creating a work, and one contributes an idea that, standing 
alone, is unoriginal, but when combined with the other’s originality it becomes 
protectable expression, the statute’s use of the word “original” does not 
preclude the recognition that authorship—for purposes of determining who 
are a work’s joint authors, not for determining what is protectable against 
others—can be unoriginal. See also Lape, supra note 37, at 65 n.113 and 
accompanying text (explaining how Congress in 1989 attempted but failed 
to amend the Copyright Act to insert the word “original” in the definition 
of joint work, such that the amended definition would have read “A ‘joint 
work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that 
their original contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole”) (emphasis added). 
160. Fourth Circuit Judge Roger Gregory has argued that “the legislative history 
undermines the notion that authorship, as it is understood in the joint-
work context, requires an independently copyrightable contribution,” pointing 
to the absence of congressional discussion over the nature of contribution 
necessary for joint authorship. Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. App’x 178, 186–91 
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For instance, someone insistent on reading it the other way might 
say, “Well, the term ‘authors’ implies more than just the contribution 
of a ‘work of authorship,’ it implies the contribution of a ‘work of auth-
orship’ that is protected by the Act, and the only kind that’s protected 
by the Act is an original, fixed work of authorship.” I don’t think we 
can say for certain that this analysis is wrong. 
So, at the very least, courts and commentators who want to require 
independent copyrightability in joint authorship can, with a straight 
face, interpret the Act’s words to require it. The statutory language 
provides no clear answer. 
In the end, it’s a question of policy. 
2. Promoting Collaborative Creativity 
As a matter of public policy, why should we recognize idea-contrib-
utors as joint authors? First, we should do so because it will incentivize 
creation in collaborative settings. The social significance of collabor-
ative creativity, particularly in the twenty-first century, has been so 
thoroughly detailed in both academic studies and business commentary 
that no one doubts its importance.161 From crowd-sourced web design, 
 
(4th Cir. 2006) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 6.07[A] (2015)). Of course, if the legislative history contained a favorable 
mention of the independent copyrightability standard, such mention would 
be compelling evidence that this is the proper standard. But unlike Professor 
Nimmer or Judge Gregory, I find it much less compelling in favor of a different 
standard that Congress failed to mention the issue at all. 
161. Creative psychologist Keith Sawyer’s work, in particular, has thoroughly 
demonstrated the importance and success of creative collaboration. E.g., 
R. Keith Sawyer, Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human 
Innovation 231–33 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the effect of collaboration on 
the success of scientific papers); Keith Sawyer, Group Genius: The 
Creative Power of Collaboration 15 (2007); R. Keith Sawyer, 
Writing as a Collaborative Act, in The Psychology of Creative Writing 
(Kaufman & Kaufman eds. 2009); see also Meghan M. Biro, Smart 
Leaders and the Power of Collaboration, Forbes (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/meghanbiro/2013/03/03/smart-leaders-and-the-power-of-
collaboration/ [http://perma.cc/6SW4-X5WR] (attributing the success of 
certain technologies and leaders to collaboration); Carlin Flora, Dream Teams, 
Psychology Today (May 1, 2008), https://www.psychologytoday.com/ 
articles/200805/dream-teams?collection=126232 [http://perma.cc/33AA-
PHUZ] (telling stories of successful collaborations); Proving the Power of 
Collaboration in Mathematics, European Research Council (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://erc.europa.eu/erc-stories/proving-power-collaboration-mathematics 
[http://perma.cc/2TF6-EKD9] (describing a mathematician who credits collab-
oration for his research success). 
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to television writing staffs, to both hard- and soft-science research, we 
enjoy the benefits of collaborative creativity throughout our society.162 
Furthermore, it’s a maxim of creativity that ideas matter.163 This 
is true in both solitary and collaborative creative contexts. A brilliant 
artist has an idea of what he wants to paint before or while she paints 
it.164 A gifted group of television writers begin with ideas of what to 
write about before or while they write it.165 To whom do we look for 
creative new approaches or solutions? The “idea person.” 
The fact that copyright doesn’t protect these ideas, by themselves, 
doesn’t mean that they aren’t of central importance to copyright. We’ve 
designed copyright for the express goal of incentivizing the expression 
of ideas, not expression for its own sake.166 But this rule that idea-
contributors can’t be joint authors cuts the legs out from this goal with 
respect to collaborative creativity. 
Think of Orson Welles. In order to most effectively bring his radio 
program to audiences each week, he chose to collaborate in the writing 
process, first with John Houseman, then with Howard Koch.167 The one 
time that Welles decided to take on a script by himself, it resulted in 
an abbreviated program.168 So, to increase the speed and quality of their 
script-production, Welles and Houseman hired Koch, and Welles relied 
on him to develop his ideas in script form—specifically, here, the idea 
 
162. See Biro, supra note 161 (recognizing collaboration as the “keystone of leader-
ship success”).  
163. See, e.g., About Ideas Matter, Ideas Matter, http://www.ideasmatter.com/ 
about [http://perma.cc/V6WV-DPEA] (“Ideas Matter is a consortium of 
cross-sector enterprises, small and medium-sized businesses and trade 
associations that aims to expand awareness and promote the benefits of 
intellectual property (IP). We firmly believe that ideas are important to the 
economy, important to society, important to companies both large and small. 
In other words, Ideas Matter.”). 
164. See, e.g., Sue Prideaux, Edvard Munch: Behind the Scream 120 
(2005) (reprinting one of the artist's writings, which describes a painting 
he is imagining). 
165. Sawyer, Writing as a Collaborative Act, supra note 161, at 169–70. 
166. VerSteeg, supra note 40, at 1365 (“[T]he 1976 Act . . . promotes progress in 
knowledge by encouraging those who conceptualize original expression to 
communicate that expression to the public . . . .”). There is such a thing as 
expression without an idea. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 311–12 (1988). But this type of creation is 
certainly at the fringes of copyright and is not its main thrust. 
167. See supra Part II.B. 
168. The remainder of the airtime was filled by the announcer. See supra note 76 
and accompanying text. One could easily imagine that, under different circum-
stances, CBS would have fired Welles (or another artist in his shoes) over such 
an incident. 
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to describe The War of the Worlds’ events as a contemporary news 
broadcast.169 
Welles’s decision to delegate the expression of his ideas thus result-
ed in, first, the hiring of a talented writer, giving him his first real 
training and experience (in Koch’s words, “Only later did I realize that 
the fringe benefits of training and discipline were worth many times my 
salary”), a writer who later coauthored one of our most beloved films, 
Casablanca.170 It led, second, and most immediately, to the massive 
success of the War of the Worlds broadcast. Had Welles tackled this 
script on his own, he probably would have failed to deliver the quality 
of material that he and Koch, together, were able to produce. Welles 
also would have had less time to devote to the work he was doing on 
Broadway, a medium in which he was simultaneously achieving new 
and exciting innovations.171 
So what lesson should we take from copyright failing to recognize 
Welles’s contribution? “When in doubt, don’t share your idea, develop 
it yourself, or you could be left with no rights in the work that your 
idea spawned.”172 Or perhaps it’s “make sure you write down all of your 
 
169. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (describing the first writing 
assignments that Koch completed for Houseman). 
170. Koch, supra note 5, at 13; see supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
172. This, as my colleague and economics expert Saurabh Vishnubhakat pointed 
out to me, is very similar to the Arrow information paradox, in which 
economist Kenneth Arrow theorized that a purely market-based sale of 
technology—without patents—would likely fail, in that the purchaser of 
technology, in deciding whether to buy it, would want sufficient information 
about the technology in order to make a purchasing decision. Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and 
Social Factors 609 (Universities-National Bureau ed. 1962); see also 
Balganesh, supra note 17, at 1731 (noting the application of the Arrow 
information paradox to joint authorship generally). Once the purchaser has 
that information, however, he has in effect obtained the capability to create 
the technology without having to pay for it. Id.; see also Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., Copyright, Derivative Works, and the Economics of Complements, 12 
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. 779, 805 (2010) (describing an “information paradox” 
that harms licensing markets). But see Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging 
Information without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2012) 
(questioning the paradox and arguing that alternative strategies for engaging 
in information exchange may be available to avoid it). 
 Here, with respect to copyright, once one collaborator has orally communicated 
an idea to another collaborator, present copyright law (or at least its present 
judicial interpretation) allows the receiver of that idea to take and exploit it 
by himself without compensating the idea’s generator. Koch, for example, 
could have taken Welles’s idea and—perfectly in line with copyright law—
used it to write a broadcast for a competing station. 
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ideas yourself first, or get your collaborator to sign a contract before 
you share your idea, no matter the whims of inspiration, the time 
crunch of deadlines, or the demands of other artistic endeavors in which 
you’re engaged.” Both of these lessons represent major roadblocks to 
the free flow of ideas—and to creative collaboration as a whole—built 
right into copyright, the law that’s supposed to exist for the express 
purpose of promoting the progress of knowledge and the arts.173 
Some, however, have argued the flipside—that recognizing idea-
contributors as joint authors would actually disincentivize collabor-
ation. This, the argument goes, is because one who’s already contribu-
ting expression wouldn’t want to risk working with someone who could 
claim joint authorship in an idea.174 But this, I think, is a fallacy. 
First, if a person is getting a truly valuable idea from a collaborator, 
then the overall benefit of that idea to the value of the copyright in the 
work will likely outweigh the potential burden of having to share 
authorship (and thus copyright ownership) with the idea-contributor.  
 In addition to disincentivizing the free flow of ideas, this off-shoot of Arrow’s 
paradox also creates an inequitable or illusory contractual bargaining position 
for the idea-generator. See infra notes 188–194 and accompanying text 
(explaining how idea-contributors suffer from diminished bargaining power 
in contract negotiations). 
173. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To secure 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”). As David Olson has noted, “At the time of the constit-
utional convention, the word ‘science’ was understood to have a broad 
meaning, certainly broader than current definitions referring to areas of 
research that rely on the scientific method. ‘Science’ referred more generally 
to knowledge and the liberal arts.” David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest 
in Promoting the Progress of Science: Constitutional Constraints on 
Copyright Laws, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 185, 187 (2011). 
 Of course, there is also the question of whether copyright incentivizes creation 
at all, see Laura J. Murray et al., Putting Intellectual Property in its Place: 
Rights Discourses, Creative Labor, and the Everyday (2014), a question 
which a recent historical study answers with a “yes, it can,” see Michela 
Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity—Evidence from Italian 
Operas 1–3, 27–29 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2505776 [http://perma. 
cc/LNR7-9R95] (suggesting that copyright laws adopted after Napoleon’s 
military victories in Northern Italy encouraged the creation of a greater 
number of high-quality operas in that region). But assuming for sake of 
argument that copyright doesn’t incentivize creation, or that we can’t know 
for sure if it does or not, then as I have suggested elsewhere, let’s simply align 
copyright as best we can with the reality of artistic creation, and let the chips 
fall where they may. McFarlin, supra note 19, at 639–40. 
174. George W. Hutchinson, Can the Federal Courts Save Rock Music?: Why A 
Default Joint Authorship Rule Should Be Adopted to Protect Co-Authors 
Under United States Copyright Law, 5 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 77, 
83 (2003) (noting how courts deciding cases under the current joint authorship 
rules have indicated that “unwelcome joint authorship would create a dis-
incentive to collaborate”). 
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Otherwise, wouldn’t the same problem dissuade two expression-
contributors from collaborating? Why should anyone collaborate and 
share ownership with anyone? 
Second, to the extent that the concern is false claims of idea-con-
tribution, a person who contributes expression will naturally be in a 
strong position to defend against such claims. The expression-contrib-
utor has her tangible expression as evidence to prove her authorial con-
tribution to the work. The only evidence a false idea-contributor has is 
her own testimony, coupled at most with the testimony of any conspir-
ators in her fraudulent scheme, which would not likely get far against 
the expression-contributor’s hard evidence.175 
The statutory requirement of intent to create a joint work is of 
course the other dam against which the feared flood of false or weak 
joint authorship claims would crash.176 And as I detail further below, I 
propose that courts require exacting evidence of such intent in idea-
contribution cases, going so far as to require evidence that the 
collaborators had a preexisting working relationship before such a claim 
could proceed to a jury.177 
As we’ve seen, then, the contribution of ideas is unquestionably 
vital to the collaborative creative enterprise. And by failing to recognize 
idea-contributors as joint authors, we risk disincentivizing collabora-
tion. Conversely, if we can find a way to give joint authorship status to 
the contributors of valuable ideas, it should incentivize collaborative 
creativity, particularly if we do so in a way that places fair limitations 
on such claims. 
 
175. This of course is also an evidentiary concern for a valid claim of idea-contrib-
ution asserted against a lying expression-contributor. I think this just goes 
to further show that concerns over a flood of joint authorship claims if the 
idea-contribution rule were to be changed are most likely exaggerated, as the 
issues of proof are daunting. 
176. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring “the intention that [the authors’] contrib-
utions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole”). 
There is also the likelihood that, if we began recognizing idea-contributors in 
the limited way I propose here, social norms would prevent a flood of joint 
authorship litigants. For instance, the social norm that goes, in essence, 
“professors at conferences offering their thoughts to a presenter on her work 
does not make them the presenter’s co-authors” would likely dissuade such 
professors from filing suit for joint authorship, for fear that they would be 
ostracized within that academic community. Cf. Dotan Oliar & Christopher 
Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual 
Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 Va. L. 
Rev. 1787, 1825–26 (2008) (explaining a social norm among stand-up 
comedians that disfavors claims of joint authorship in jokes, specifically 
where one comedian who developed a joke’s premise would be considered 
within the comedy community the joke’s sole author, even if a second 
comedian had contributed the joke’s punch-line). 
177. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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A typical objection raised at this point in the discussion, though, is 
that Welles should have entered into contract with his collaborator 
Koch, because contract law is the best way to protect idea-contributors, 
not copyright. So let’s examine that objection. 
3. Ensuring Rightful Credit, Compensation, and Bargaining Power 
“Did my poverty help my creativity? Uh, no.” 
—Orson Welles, looking back on his career178 
Some might dismiss his failed stab at recognition as a joint author 
of the War of the Worlds broadcast as purely Welles’s folly, an outlier 
where he simply should have known well enough to have secured a 
contract protecting his rights, or to at least have written down his idea 
before he had Koch script it. I think there are a few important responses 
to this way of thinking. 
In the first place, Orson Welles was working under tight deadlines 
in what was, at the time, a cutting-edge artistic endeavor. Taking a 
Broadway theatre company to the radio was a new concept in a rel-
atively new industry, and there had not yet been time to develop an 
iron-clad industry custom for contractual relationships (such as the 
system in place in Hollywood today).179 In this environment, is it sur-
prising that a twenty-three-year-old Welles did not draw up a contract 
regarding his share in the copyright to the scripts? 
Next, what was his real-time incentive to do so? No one truly ex-
pected the mass public reaction to the War of the Worlds broadcast, 
and thus no one knew its potential value. Indeed, Koch’s approxi-
mately fifteen other Mercury Theatre on the Air scripts produced zero 
copyright-related income in the twenty years after he wrote them.180 So, 
juggling his hectic Broadway and radio schedules, is it surprising that 
Welles did not write out a contract with Koch delineating his rights in 
something that no one expected would be worth anything? 
My overall point is that we should primarily view copyright’s de-
fault joint authorship rules as a way to credit and compensate cutting-
edge artists that are creating works whose ultimate value is uncertain 
 
178. Magician: The Astonishing Life & Work of Orson Welles (Cohen 
Media 2014). 
179. See FilmContracts.net, http://www.filmcontracts.net/ [https://perma. 
cc/2J6T-VJTH] (containing a massive directory of film industry template 
contracts). Needless to say, a similar resource was not available to Orson 
Welles in his 1930s radio work. 
180. Transcript, supra note 23, at 160 (“Q. Of these 15 scripts, approximately 
are there any others that you have ever sold rights to . . . anyone else? A. 
No, there were no others.”). 
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at best.181 Many if not most of these artists are not going to enter into 
a contract delineating their rights before they collaborate, no matter 
how much we in the legal profession try to encourage them to do so. 
But if they have a general sense that copyright will recognize their 
authorship and protect them if and when their endeavor becomes valu-
able, instead of a distrust of copyright stemming from stories like that 
of Orson Welles, these artists might be more inclined to pursue such 
new and uncharted artistic courses. 
Contract law, on the other hand, is more useful for artists operating 
within established industries like the Hollywood studio system, where 
there are accessible funding sources, the creative product is a known 
and thus more easily valued commodity, and there has been time to 
develop a customary system of contractual relationships and division of 
rights among creative collaborators.182 
So, recognizing idea-contributors as joint authors would protect 
innovators’ creative investment and not leave it entirely to the state-
by-state vagaries of contract law. Our Constitution has empowered 
Congress to establish a uniform national system of copyright law to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” and it has given the 
judiciary the job of interpreting copyright law in line with this goal.183 
Leaving contract law—a non-uniform, state-by-state system—as idea-
contributors’ only recourse defeats, in my view, copyright’s national 
constitutional purpose and responsibility with respect to these artists.184  
181. Here, when I speak of credit, I refer primarily to the general association in the 
public mind between original copyright ownership (as opposed to ownership 
obtained via a transfer from the original owner) and authorship. The work of 
Roberta Kwall, particularly in her book The Soul of Creativity, argues 
persuasively that U.S. copyright law, like that of many other countries, 
should require that works be attributed to their authors. Kwall Soul 
of Creativity, supra note 141. Many outside of the world of intellectual 
property law would, I think, be surprised to learn that this is not already 
required under U.S. copyright law and that authors not properly credited 
for their work must resort to other enforcement mechanisms. See 3 Nimmer, 
supra note 16, at § 8D.03[4]; McFarlin, supra note 19, at 587 n.25. 
182. Of course, practical political reality gives established industries a better ability 
to lobby Congress for copyright protections than cutting-edge artists. See, 
e.g., Julian Hattem, Study: Film Industry Beefing Up Lobbying, The Hill 
(Feb. 27, 2014) (“The film lobby has been dramatically beefing up its presence 
in Washington.”). But at least on this specific issue—in which life-tenured 
federal judges are deciding which interpretation of already-present statutory 
language is better policy—cutting-edge artists should have a better chance at 
a fair shake. 
183. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; art. III. 
184. See supra note 25 for an example of how some, but not all states recognize 
“idea submission” claims under a theory of implied contract. These claims 
could help an idea-contributor seeking compensation for her work, but they 
obviously lack national uniformity and could create choice of law issues for 
collaborations occurring across state lines. With the ever-expanding use of 
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If an idea-contributor’s contract is invalidated under a given state’s 
law,185 then he or she is simply out of luck, as opposed to the expression-
contributor, who would still have the default protections of federal 
copyright law on which to fall back. 
A similar problem faces those who would argue that copyright’s 
work-for-hire provisions already adequately protect high-level idea-
contributors like Welles.186 Welles (or at least his legal counsel) appar-
ently thought so too—having made the belated argument on appeal 
that he, as Koch’s employer, was the owner of Koch’s creative output—
but Welles’s argument fell on unsympathetic ears, with the Ninth 
Circuit deciding that the evidence did not support a finding of an 
employer-employee relationship.187 Given that the question of whether 
such a relationship exists is dependent on multiple, uncertain factors,188 
an idea-contributor can, like Welles, be easily left with no rights in the 
work, whereas an expression-contributor, again, always has joint auth-
orship on which to fall back. 
Further, in the instances where collaborators do negotiate a contr-
act, the default copyright authorship rules provide a baseline for nego-
tiations.189 By excluding idea-contributors from authorship, we place 
them in an unequal bargaining position in such negotiations. If an idea-
contributor were entitled to a co-equal ownership share by default, this  
the Internet for collaborative creativity, such issues can only increase in the 
coming years. State law contract claims also, at a basic level, do not offer 
plaintiffs the public perception of authorship in the overall work that comes 
with copyright. 
185. See, e.g., 5 Williston on Contracts § 9:1–9:3 (4th ed.) (noting different 
state laws regarding minors’ capacity to contract). And in the situation of a 
collaboration across multiple states, such as an internet collaboration, which 
state’s contract law will apply? The answer is often difficult and is left up 
to rules designed long before the advent of the Internet. See Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971). 
186. See 1 Goldstein, supra note 152, at § 4.2.1.2 (noting that joint authorship 
questions are often “resolved under the work for hire provision”).  
187. Welles v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 308 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1962). 
188. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)(“Among 
the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source 
of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of 
the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right 
to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in 
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the 
hired party. No one of these factors is determinative.”). 
189. See Kwall, Soul of Creativity, supra note 141 (noting that creative 
collaborators negotiate contracts on top of, and in relation to, the default 
rules set by copyright law). 
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would give her added leverage to bargain for more of the ownership pie, 
more rights, more money.190 If the idea-contributor, at the start, is entit-
led to nothing, then she loses that significant bargaining chip. 
In Welles’s case, as producer and director of The Mercury Theatre 
on the Air,191 he would have had other negotiating leverage—he could, 
for instance, have fired and replaced Koch if Koch insisted on owning 
the copyright in the scripts—but if the shoes were on the other feet, 
and Koch was the idea-contributor, what bargaining power would he 
have had? Little to none. So, even where artists are negotiating their 
respective rights as a matter of contract, the joint authorship default 
rules still make a difference. 
 
190. Commentators have argued that U.S. copyright law should, like several other 
countries, allow for sliding-scale ownership allocation in joint authorship 
litigation, as opposed to the mandatorily equal shares the law currently 
assigns to joint authors who have no contrary agreement. See, e.g., Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1015, 
1056–57 (2015); Gregory N. Mandel, LeftBrain Versus Right-Brain: Competing 
Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 283, 352–57 (2010); Benjamin E. Jaffe, Comment, Rebutting the Equality 
Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy Law Model to Enhance the Remedies 
Available to Joint Copyright Owners, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1549, 1571–79; 
Susan Keller, Comment, Collaboration in Theater: Problems and Copyright 
Solutions, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 891, 933–37 (1986). 
 As Roberta Kwall has explained, joint authorship under U.S. copyright law 
stems from the “tenants in common” model of property ownership, a model 
which generally allows for co-ownership of unequal shares in a piece of 
property. Kwall, Soul of Creativity, supra note 141. Given that the 
Copyright Act does not expressly mandate coequal ownership, courts could 
change their present stance that joint authors (in the absence of a contract 
providing otherwise) must share ownership equally and, instead, courts 
could choose to allocate unequal ownership shares in some joint authorship 
disputes. Id. However, given judges’ historic disinclination towards the type 
of decision-making that such sliding-scale ownership allocation would 
require—e.g., trying to figure out the exact percentage a piano player’s input 
contributed to the creation of the overall work: 30%, 60%, 42%, 77%?—I 
don’t expect that the courts will change their position on this issue. E.g., 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). I tend to agree with 
this rationale for the courts’ present position—that the difficulties involved 
in determining sliding-scale percentages for multiple creative contributions 
outweigh the equitable benefits of doing so—and, accordingly, one of the 
reasons I advocate for requiring that a joint author have “substantially 
contributed to the essence of the work” is to ensure that where a coequal share 
is awarded, it is awarded to a major contributor. See McFarlin, supra note 
19, at 662.  
191. See supra notes 56–71 and accompanying text (explaining Welles’s role in 
creating, writing, and directing The Mercury Theatre on the Air). 
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Finally, I believe it helps here to take a long-view of Welles’s career. 
We tend, if we don’t look too closely, to remember him as a hugely 
successful artist. If we measure success in lasting influence and respect, 
then we’re certainly right. But if we measure it in dollars and cents, 
then we’re very wrong. After leaving radio to pursue a career in film, 
Welles made movies that—though many now regard them as great 
artistic achievements—were usually box-office failures.192 He soon had 
to take bit acting roles and scrounge for investors, often putting his 
films on hold for years until he could find more money to finish them.193 
Some he never finished.194 
If he had been able to financially benefit from the War of the 
Worlds broadcast as its joint author and co-owner of its copyright, 
Welles may well have used that money to fund his films.195 Instead, as 
an idea-contributor, this potential income source was closed to him, and 
thus our copyright law failed to promote the progress of at least one 
significant artist’s work. 
B. How We Should Recognize Idea-Contributors 
We’ve now looked at some compelling reasons for why we should 
recognize idea-contributors as joint authors. But it’s not enough to stop 
there. To change the ingrained judicial prejudice against these idea-
contributors, we need to figure out how to recognize them. 
Some very valid questions need to be answered: are all ideas worthy 
of joint authorship? If not, where do we draw the line? Can we do this 
in a way that doesn’t cause a flood of joint authorship claimants? I 
think there are three primary ways to answer these questions and there-
by define how we can, in a practical manner, bring idea-contributors 
into the joint authorship fold. 
1. Substantial Creative Contribution 
First, we need to decide whether all ideas contributed with the 
requisite intent to create a joint work should qualify for joint author-
ship. The answer in my view is no, not all ideas—only substantial ones. 
There are ideas on the fringes, having only a minimal impact on the 
work, which I think most of us would reasonably agree do not constitute 
authorship of a creative work. For example, if Orson Welles had told 
Howard Koch to describe one of the characters in the War of the Worlds 
broadcast as wearing a blue suit, I don’t think anyone would think an 
 
192. Brady, supra note 3, at 460, 550; Heyer, supra note 57. 
193. See Heyer, supra note 57. 
194. Id. 
195. Regarding the benefits that accrued to Howard Koch and his descendants, 
see notes 135–136 and accompanying text. 
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insubstantial idea like that—“make a character wear a blue suit”—
would or should constitute authorship. 
On the other hand, the more substantial the impact an idea has (or 
ideas have) on the essence of the work, the more it takes the form of 
authorship. As Welles himself remarked, the idea to do the War of the 
Worlds broadcast as a series of fake news bulletins “was the guide for 
the dialogue, radio effects, the whole organization of the material. It is 
the heart of the matter.”196 The very essence of the broadcast was influ-
enced—dictated is perhaps the better word—by Welles’s idea. Koch 
wrote the expression—the dialogue, the effects, the description of 
events—in a manner reflecting and conforming to the idea that Welles 
provided.197 
Of course we’re not compelled to agree with Welles’s characteriz-
ation of his idea as “the heart of the matter,” but I believe that a judge 
or jury should be able to decide—as a question of fact—whether an idea 
like Welles’s is substantial enough to constitute joint authorship in a 
work. 
Using a contribution’s substantiality as the basis for evaluating 
joint authorship claims—with respect to ideas but also with respect to 
expression—provides a benchmark which helps to ensure that the credit 
and financial compensation attached to joint authorship are reserved 
for the major contributors to a copyrighted work. 
I believe substantiality also aligns with the use of the term 
“authors” in the Copyright Act’s “joint work” definition. A sole author 
has inarguably substantially contributed to the essence of a copyrighted 
work: she has contributed all of the essence of the work. Thus, requiring 
a substantial contribution by one who claims to be a joint author lines 
up at a common-sense level with the joint work definition’s use of the 
plural term “authors.” We’re looking for people who have contributed 
to a work in a way that’s something less than a contribution of the 
entire essence of the work but something more than tangential or very 
minor input. 
I’ve explained elsewhere my proposed use of this substantiality con-
cept in joint authorship generally,198 but with respect to the contrib-
ution of ideas there are a few points that bear specific elaboration here.  
196. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. For further specifics on how 
I define the “essence” of a work and why I believe that this term is useful in 
the joint authorship context, see McFarlin, supra note 19, at 653–62. The use 
of the term “essence” also helps distinguish my proposed use of substantiality 
from the one criticized in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, which basically equated the 
term “substantial creative contribution” with a contribution of anything more 
than de minimis creative input. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232–
34 (9th Cir. 2000). 
198. See McFarlin, supra note 19, at 653–62 (arguing that the touchstone of the 
joint authorship analysis should be whether a collaborator “substantially 
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contributed to the essence of the work”). Mary LaFrance has used the term 
“substantial” in proposing an approach to determining joint authorship 
contrary to the one the Second Circuit adopted in the Childress decision. Mary 
LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving 
the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 Emory L.J. 193, 194 (2001); see also 
Balganesh, supra note 17, at 1745–46 (explaining that his proposal to improve 
how courts determine the requisite intent for joint authorship necessarily 
involves a determination of whether putative coauthors’ respective contrib-
utions were substantial enough to plausibly motivate each other to create a 
work together). My proposed use of substantiality builds on that first proposed 
by LaFrance, but seeks to add a more specific and stringent formulation of 
the concept. See McFarlin, supra note 19, at 653–62 (factoring in industry 
custom and requiring that a contribution not only be substantial but also one 
that affects the essence of the work). I believe, also, that my proposed definition 
and use of substantiality would fit rather naturally within Balganesh’s 
proposed improvement to the intent requirement. 
 Additionally, Judge Roger Gregory in a 2006 dissenting opinion similarly 
suggested that a “substantial original contribution” standard should replace 
the independently copyrightable contribution requirement, explaining his 
view that “[a]lthough this standard necessarily entails a more exhaustive 
assessment of the respective contributions of the parties and the particular 
media at issue, I believe that it is a more thorough and equitable approach. 
Further, this standard is more consistent with the plain language and 
legislative history.” Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. App’x 178, 189 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished) (Gregory, J. dissenting); see also supra notes 146–162 and 
accompanying text. 
 Where I respectfully diverge from Judge Gregory, at least regarding this 
issue, is that I would not mandate that the contribution be independently 
original. See supra notes 151–160 and infra notes 217–222 and accompanying 
text. (It seems that Judge Gregory and I might also disagree on the type of 
intent required for joint authorship.) Compare Flowers, 196 F. App’x at 190–
91, with McFarlin, supra note 19, at 635–40. 
 It is also worth noting here that (to the extent it was not clear already by the 
Berry-Johnson test’s use of the word “author” in the term “joint author”) a 
substantial contribution naturally must be one of authorship, i.e., creative 
activity that does not simply comply with another’s direction. See supra note 
22 and accompanying text. For instance, if Johnson was merely playing the 
exact notes that Berry told him to play in the exact manner that Berry 
instructed him, then Johnson would not have made a substantial contribution 
to the essence of the songs at issue in that case. See McFarlin, supra note 19, 
at 582 n. 11 and 657. 
 Here, similarly, Houseman’s listening to Welles’s idea and then relaying it 
exactly to Koch would not alone have constituted a substantial contribution 
to the essence of the War of the Worlds radio play. See supra notes 106, 112, 
and accompanying text. A judge would easily have found this to have been 
a matter on which no reasonable jury could have decided otherwise. 
 However, hypothetically speaking, if Houseman had changed Welles’s idea 
in relaying it to Koch (such as instructing Koch to write not merely in the 
form of a news bulletin but a news bulletin done entirely in the form of a 
government agency’s emergency notification), and Koch had integrated 
Houseman’s emergency notification idea into the script, then it is possible—
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First, courts have largely labeled as an “idea” any creative contrib-
ution that is either unfixed, too abstract to be considered “expression,” 
or both.199 This is the starting line for determining an idea’s substantial-
ity. An idea that has little to no influence on the essence of a copyright-
ed work’s final, fixed, original expression (like the “make a character 
wear a blue suit” example, above) or that is so unspecific as to be useless 
to the final, fixed, original expression (like “write me a radio play”) 
would certainly be insubstantial, in that no one would reasonably argue 
it should qualify for authorship in a work. 
However, as an idea moves up each of these scales—influence on 
the work’s essence and specificity—it becomes more substantial and 





















The commissioning of a work—that is, requesting that it be creat-
ed—provides a good context in which to illustrate this concept. Courts 
have regularly refused to recognize as a joint author someone who com-
missions a work.200 For example, in 2010, the Federal Circuit discussed 
two hypothetical situations where a person commissioning a work 
would, in the court’s view, not be a joint author:  
under the Berry-Johnson test—for Houseman to have a colorable joint 
authorship claim based on his having substantially contributed to the essence 
of the broadcast. In other words, in that hypothetical scenario, it likely would 
have been an issue for a jury. 
199. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
200. See Nimmer, supra note 16, at § 6.07 (summarizing cases on commissioned 
and architectural works). 
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If one commissioned a work for a cowboy riding a horse, that 
contribution would not constitute copyrightable expression . . . . 
If one later instructed the artist to depict the cowboy as weather-
ed, wearing a cowboy hat, and riding slowly in calm wind, that 
would not rise to the level of copyrightable expression.201 
The reason the court gave for denying joint authorship in each of 
these cowboy drawings is that ideas and directions—absent tangible 
expression—are insufficient for joint authorship.202 
But isn’t there a difference between the two examples? In the first, 
the commissioner provides little guidance for the expression of the work. 
A “cowboy riding a horse” is a very unspecific idea, providing little 
detail for the actual expression of the artwork. On the other hand, 
“depict the cowboy as weathered, wearing a cowboy hat, and riding 
slowly in calm wind” more substantially guides the expression of the 
artwork. And to take the Federal Circuit’s example a few steps further, 
what about the contribution of an idea to draw a “cowboy with a dog’s 
face, riding his horse upside down, floating over the surface of Mars, 
with lightning bolts shooting out of his eyes”? Is this idea still unworthy 
of joint authorship, if the completed work incorporates every aspect of 
it? 
Courts, I think, get incorrectly caught up in whether a work has 
been “commissioned” or not. There are, as detailed above, situations 
where a person commissioning a work can contribute an idea or ideas 
that guide the work’s expression, such that—absent a contract to the 
contrary and presuming the existence of the requisite intent—that 
person should have a colorable claim to joint authorship. A person who 
says “draw me a picture” or “paint me someone’s portrait” or “write 
me a novel” is commissioning a work—no more, no less. There’s no 
question of authorship in the picture, portrait, or novel. 
But a person who says “draw me a picture of X,” or “paint me a 
portrait of Y,” or “write me a novel about Z” is contributing an idea 
that guides the expression of the work. The idea may not be worthy of 
joint authorship, but if so, this should be because a judge or jury decides 
that the idea did not guide the work’s expression substantially enough, 
and not because of a black and white rule that ideas cannot constitute 
joint authorship. For example, if a person based a joint authorship 
claim on X=“a cowboy on a horse,” Y=“a tall tree,” or Z=“a beautiful 
 
201. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted). 
202. Id. 
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woman,” a court could easily dispose of the claim on a motion to dis-
miss, deciding as a matter of law that the idea is insufficiently specific 
and influential to constitute joint authorship.203 
I think it’s much more difficult, however, to deny that X=“a cow-
boy with a dog’s face, riding his horse upside down, floating over the 
surface of Mars, with lightning bolts shooting out of his eyes” guides 
the person who puts pencil to paper to an extent that it should, at least 
arguably, constitute joint authorship in the work as a whole. In grayer 
areas like this one, whether the contribution of an idea qualifies as joint 
authorship—i.e., whether it lands in the “Authorship Zone” shown on 
the chart above—should be a question of fact decided by a judge or 
jury.204 And, in my view, the primary guidepost for that decision should 
 
203. Case-specific context, though, is still important. The idea to “draw a cowboy 
on a horse” in the context of a final work that is more than a rudimentary 
drawing—e.g., a drawing that involves creative choices like perspective, 
scenery, shading, etc.—would easily be too unspecific and uninfluential on 
the drawing’s final, fixed, original expression to constitute joint authorship. 
But if the drawing is a simple stick-figure human on a stick-figure horse (and 
presuming that the requisite joint authorship intent exists), whether the idea 
is substantial enough to constitute joint authorship in that stick-figure art 
could be a question of fact for a jury. In real life, of course, rare would be the 
legal dispute arising over the authorship of stick figures. 
 On the other hand, a minimalist conceptual piece, where one contributor’s 
abstract idea greatly influenced the other contributor’s minimal amount of 
expression (e.g., dip an orange in blood, symbolizing the blood spilled from 
the workers who pick them), could become the subject of litigation, giving 
us a real-life example of why we need to judge specificity and influence on a 
spectrum, rather than on a hard dividing line. 
204. See also Robert Pechina, Note, The Creative Commissioner: Commissioned 
Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 373, 393–402 
(1988). Pechina proposes that where the commissioning party dictates 
expression to the commissioned party, then the work could be, under 
Pechina’s proposed amendment to the Copyright Act, a work made for hire. 
Id. Under Pechina’s proposal, however, the result is still zero-sum, making 
only one party the author. Also, in practice, as detailed above, it’s not easy 
to determine where to draw the line between idea and expression, particularly 
when, as is often the case, both commissioner and commissionee are contrib-
uting a mix of ideas and expression. Pechina does note though that joint 
authorship is another possible solution. Id. at 394 n.171. I believe my proposed 
substantiality standard can turn that possibility into reality.  
 And, with respect to the line between idea and expression, let’s consider Russ 
Versteeg’s example of “writing a melody that will evoke in the listener a 
mood of summertime.” Versteeg, supra note 40, at 1346. The idea “I’d like us 
to write a melody” is devoid of any guide for expression, but the idea of “I’d 
like us to write a melody that will evoke in the listener a mood of summer-
time” is an idea that, in my view, does guide how a work will be fixed into a 
tangible medium of expression. It may be found that it is still too abstract 
or uninfluential to qualify for joint authorship, but that should be a determin-
ation for a judge or jury. VerSteeg would apparently limit joint authorship 
to actually hearing the exact notes of the melody and then communicating 
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Here, in Orson Welles’s case, if he’d simply told Koch to “write me 
a radio play,” he had have commissioned the War of the Worlds broad-
cast and nothing more. But instead Welles contributed an idea that 
guided how that work was to be expressed in a tangible medium, and 
Welles should have had the opportunity (if contested by Koch) for a 
judge or jury to decide, based on the specificity and influence of his idea 
on the essence of the broadcast, whether he was, with Koch, its joint 
author.206 
 
it to another. Id. I think this is unnecessarily limiting and essentially takes us 
back to requiring that each author contribute separately copyrightable 
expression. But if an idea contributed by one person substantially guides 
the expression of another, then it’s true that two people have collaborated 
to create the same, indivisible expression. If the collaborator is inspired to 
choose certain notes by the suggestion that they evoke the mood of 
summertime, then the collaborators have together created one inseparable 
expression—notes evoking the mood of summertime. See id. 
 One thing this discussion ultimately reinforces is that copyright has two 
understandings of the term “idea.” One is any creative contribution that isn’t 
put into a tangible medium of expression. The other is an abstract thought, 
like “a melody in a summertime mood,” as opposed to a specific thought (or 
series of thoughts) such as the exact musical notes of a melody. Some would 
deny joint authorship for any contribution falling within the first definition 
(“unfixed”). Others, like VerSteeg, would appear to only deny joint authorship 
for contributions falling with the second (“abstract”). I believe that both of 
these definitions are, in the context of joint authorship, artificial. I argue that 
all of the above—unfixed highly specific ideas, unfixed abstract ideas, and 
fixed abstract ideas—can, if their impact on a completed collaborative work 
is determined to be substantial, constitute joint authorship. Cf. Christopher 
Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 101 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2016) (rejecting the idea/expression dichotomy entirely and proposing that 
authorship be defined as intentionally creating mental effects in an audience). 
205. Another possible approach is assigning proportionate ownership interests. 
E.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 190, at 1056–57 (“In determining the 
ownership share, the court would take into account the relative contribution 
of each of the parties to the final product.”). As discussed above, I believe 
that a substantiality standard, maintaining the coequal share approach is 
better primarily because it’s an easier, more efficient standard for judges and 
juries to apply. See supra note 190. A judge or jury is better equipped to 
decide whether a creative contribution is substantial enough to deserve a 
coequal ownership share than it is to decide whether a contribution 
constituted, for example, twenty percent of the work versus fifteen percent 
of the work, or seventy versus seventy-three percent, or twelve versus eight 
percent of the work, etc. It also avoids expending judicial resources on what 
are ultimately creatively marginal contributions (for example, eight percent 
of a work created by two authors) and ensures that where authorship is 
litigated, it’s only regarding creatively substantial contributions. 
206. A judge or jury would also of course decide whether Welles and Koch intended 
to merge their contributions together into inseparable or interdependent 
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2. Exacting Evidence of Intent: A Preexisting Working Relationship 
In addition to substantiality, another way to delineate where we 
should recognize idea-contributors as joint authors is for courts in such 
cases to require exacting evidence of the intent to create a joint work, 
going so far as to require a preexisting working relationship among the 
collaborators. 
Proponents of the present rule—that each joint author’s contrib-
ution be independently copyrightable—have raised the concern that 
permitting ideas to qualify for joint authorship could restrict the flow 
of ideas.207 That is, they think that if Jill has an idea, and describes it 
out loud, then Jack should be able to use that idea in a copyrighted 
work without worrying whether Jill will later assert a joint authorship 
interest in the work. 
I appreciate this concern, and I think it’s one we should address. 
One way to deal with it would be to require exacting, objective evidence 
that the collaborators intended to create a joint work.208 The Ninth 
Circuit, for instance, has pointed to whether the collaborators shared 
authorship credit on the final product as a type of objective evidence 
of intent.209 I’ve noted elsewhere the problems that exist with using the 
sharing of credit as evidence of intent in the joint authorship context, 
in that it focuses more on whether the parties thought of themselves as 
joint authors as opposed to whether they actually intended to merge 
their contributions together into one work, per the statutory definition 
of a joint work.210 
But here, given the reasonable concern that an unlimited recog-
nition of idea-contribution as joint authorship could dissuade idea-
sharing, I think that a heightened examination of objective criteria, 
such as how the contributors billed themselves, would be appropriate 
in deciding an idea-contributor’s joint authorship claim. 
 
parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). For further discussion on 
how an improved joint authorship rule can provide better results in situations 
regarding commissioned works, see Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship 
of Commissioned Works, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 867, 867 (1989) (explaining 
that “joint authorship is the more principled, efficient, and equitable model 
for courts to apply in the commissioned work context”). 
207. 1 Goldstein, supra note 152, at § 4.2.1.2; see also supra notes 172–175 and 
accompanying text. 
208. The Copyright Act’s definition of a “joint work” requires “the intention that 
[the authors’] contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
209. E.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing 
the authorship of the Pirates of Penzance as “Gilbert and Sullivan” as an 
example of objective intent to be coauthors). 
210. McFarlin, supra note 19, at 635–40. 
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A specific type of evidence that I believe courts can and should 
examine is whether a preexisting working relationship existed between 
the idea-contributor and her purported joint author(s). Requiring that 
such collaborators have a preexisting working relationship would help 
resolve the potentially problematic scenario where Jack is talking about 
his art (e.g., a cowboy drawing)211 at a dinner party, Jill tells him how 
he should draw it (with a dog’s face, riding his horse upside down, 
floating over the surface of Mars, with lightning bolts shooting out of 
his eyes),212 Jack replies, “That’s a great idea!” and he proceeds to draw 
the cowboy in that fashion. It’s arguable under a very broad reading of 
the joint work definition that the work was “prepared” by both with 
an intent to merge their contributions.213 
But on a policy level, I agree with the concerned crowd that giving 
Jill a basis to claim joint authorship in a situation like this would dis-
courage the free flow of ideas. Jack and Jill had no prior relevant work-
ing relationship based on which Jill should reasonably expect to gain 
credit and compensation for contributing her idea, and Jack should not 
reasonably expect to have to share it with her. 
But if, for instance, Jill and Jack were two independent contractors 
working for the same advertising company discussing the concept for 
their next campaign,214 and Jill came up with the idea of using the 
concept of a space cowboy, on Mars, with a dog’s face, and lasers shoot-
ing from his eyes, and Jack took this idea and made drawing of it, then 
Jill should reasonably expect to have a claim for joint authorship in 
that drawing. Their working relationship creates a reasonable expect-
ation that the law should acknowledge and protect—namely, that if Jill 
contributes an idea in a situation in which Jack and Jill are already 
working together, she should, as a default rule, be entitled to joint 
authorship if that idea substantially guides the expression of a tangible, 
copyrightable work drawn by Jack.215 Given these reasonable expect-
ations, we can also draw a reasonable inference that Jack and Jill in-
tended to jointly author the work. 
 
211. See the example discussed supra in Part III.B.I. 
212. Id. 
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
214. They are independent contractors instead of employees so as to take this 
hypothetical out of a work-for-hire scenario. 
215. For a detailed discussion regarding the use of the law to protect people’s 
reasonable expectations, see Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally 
Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 19 (1997). And to 
those who would say that, by considering the parties’ reasonable expectations, 
it sounds like I’m importing an implied contract-type of analysis into copy-
right law, I would say first that no, I simply think parties’ reasonable expect-
ations are relevant to an objective evaluation of their intent, and second that 
a uniform national way of examining parties’ reasonable expectations in 
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With respect to the War of the Worlds broadcast, Welles and 
Houseman had hired Koch as an independent contractor to write scripts 
for the Mercury Theatre on the Air series before the War of the Worlds 
show was even discussed.216 Given this preexisting working relation-
ship—one that was relevant to the copyrighted work at issue (e.g., they 
weren’t two teammates on the New York Yankees discussing ideas for 
a radio play)—Welles could reasonably expect to be able to claim joint 
authorship in his fake-news-bulletin idea that Koch used to guide the 
script, and Koch in turn could reasonably expect to share authorship 
with Welles. Koch couldn’t reasonably claim that he didn’t intend to 
jointly author the work, nor could Welles reasonably disclaim it. 
With respect to the novel, however, H.G. Wells and his brother 
Frank had no relevant prior working relationship—e.g., they did not 
regularly coauthor science fiction stories—so Frank would have had no 
reasonable expectation that uttering his extemporaneous idea (“Supp-
ose some beings from another planet were to drop out of the sky sudden-
ly, and begin laying about them here!”) would entitle him to joint 
authorship in his brother H.G.’s book, nor would H.G. have reasonably 
expected to need to share the copyright with Frank.217 H.G. could not 
later reasonably claim that he intended to author a novel with his bro-
ther based on that idea. 
Ultimately, then, I think that courts can use this “preexisting 
working relationship” concept as—if not a requirement (since it’s not 
expressly in the Copyright Act)—at least a highly relevant consider-
ation in determining whether purported collaborators actually intended 
to prepare a work together, as the Copyright Act requires.218 This in 
 
a creative collaboration is preferable to ceding the job to the state-by-state 
vagaries of contract law. See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text. 
216. See Welles v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 308 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1962); 
see also supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 186–188 and accompanying text. This preexisting working 
relationship requirement would thus address Paul Goldstein’s concern, 
described in more detail infra at notes 224–225 and accompanying text, 
where “a nonagenarian author would . . . be able to use the ‘ideas’ provided 
by his infant great-granddaughter as the basis for a claim that the two are 
co-authors of a joint work whose copyright will only expire seventy years 
after the death of the last of them to die.” 1 Goldstein, supra note 152, at 
§ 4.2. One would hazard to guess that the nonagenarian author and his infant 
great-granddaughter were not publishing books together beforehand. 
 And, on a related note, if this nonagenarian-fraud scenario was a real concern, 
wouldn’t we be seeing, under present law, older authors claiming that their 
fifteen-year old granddaughters have contributed a page of independently 
copyrightable expression to a book, in order to increase the length of copyright? 
In other words, I don’t think the problem—to the extent it actually exists—
is exclusive to “ideas.” 
218. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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turn should make it easier for a court to decide in a given case whether 
an idea-contributor is a joint author.  
3. Originality as a Prerequisite? 
Another possible requirement for an idea-contributor to qualify as 
a joint author is that his or her idea be “original,” since, per the Copy-
right Act, “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of auth-
orship.”219 As we discussed above, although I believe that a better read-
ing of this language is that it applies only to works as a whole (and not 
to joint authors’ respective contributions),220 I do still think that origin-
ality could be used as a way—from a policy perspective—to narrow the 
types of ideas that qualify for joint authorship. In so doing, we would 
be saying essentially that only original ideas, i.e., ones that were not 
taken from someone else, are worthy of joint authorship. 
Using originality in this way has an undeniable surface attraction. 
In theory it would promote new creative thinking, as opposed to the 
recycling of old ideas, and it could lessen the number of joint authorship 
claims brought to the courts. But there are at least a couple of problems 
with this. 
First, I don’t think it reflects the reality of creative collaboration. 
Creative teams often use preexisting ideas in new and exciting ways to 
create what is, as a whole, original expression. Orson Welles, as we’ve 
seen, was not the first person to come up with the idea of doing a radio 
play in the form of fake news bulletins.221 Ronald Knox in England and 
Archibald MacLeish in the United States had created broadcasts in this 
format before.222 But applying the fake bulletin idea in the context of 
adapting H.G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds, as expressed through 
Koch’s scriptwriting, resulted in a fake broadcast of a present-day 
Martian invasion that was, on the whole, original. Had Welles not 
contributed this idea, regardless of its origins, then the final broadcast 
would not have been expressed in the same way, nor would it have had 
the same impact on its audience.223  
219. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
220. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the type of contribution required in 
order to constitute “authorship” under the Copyright Act). 
221. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text (discussing Welles’s likely 
influences). 
222. Arguably, though, Welles’s idea was original. No one had thought to adapt 
and perform The War of the Worlds as a fake news broadcast, which, with 
its alien invaders and disastrous destruction, ended up having a much larger 
impact than its fake news predecessors Broadcasting the Barricades, The 
Fall of the City, or Air Raid. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text. 
223. I’m not saying we should engage in ex post judgment of authorship based 
on later commercial success, like the Ninth Circuit in Lee would have us 
do, I’m simply saying that we should recognize the importance of ideas in 
guiding expression, and that because we don’t know what aspect of the work 
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We could, furthermore, actually expend more judicial resources in 
deciding whether an individual contribution was, in fact, original. 
Courts in joint authorship lawsuits could, first, easily get tied up in 
analyzing voluminous numbers of tangible works to try to determine 
whether the idea at issue is encapsulated within them. Second, and 
perhaps worse, courts might have to examine evidence of ideas com-
municated by people who aren’t parties to the suit and have no interest 
in it. For example, Koch here, if he were contesting a joint authorship 
claim by Welles, could hypothetically seek to put on testimony that ten 
years prior, someone had given Welles the idea to adapt The War of 
the Worlds as a fake news broadcast. On the other hand, if we view 
originality as only a concern for the work as a whole—thereby acknow-
ledging that collaborators can combine unoriginal but creatively sub-
stantial elements to build an original work—we would avoid such 
evidentiary quagmires. 
I believe, then, that we should protect all substantial, intentional 
contributors to a collaborative creation, regardless of whether their in-
dividual contributions when dissected do not meet copyright’s original-
ity requirement.224 However, I also believe that recognizing substantial 
idea-contributors as joint authors, with the requirement that their ideas 
be original, would be better than completely barring them from copy-
right joint authorship, as we currently do. It would at least be a step 
in the right direction. 
C. The Benefits Outweigh the Fears 
In discussing the merits of recognizing idea-contributors as joint 
authors, we’ve already touched on several of the fears raised by those 
opposed to such recognition. For example, we looked at how some have 
worried that recognizing idea-contributors as joint authors would im-
pede the free flow of ideas in creative work, and we saw that it would 
more likely have the opposite effect: it would encourage idea-sharing 
within collaborations. Additionally, we saw how false claims of idea-
contribution would face strong, built-in defenses—the intent require-
ment and the hard evidence of written expression—so that, as a result, 
 
will ultimately bring it success we should protect all substantial creative 
contributions to a work, whether idea or expression. See Aalmuhammed v. 
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that “audience appeal” is a 
factor in determining joint authorship); McFarlin, supra note 19, at 651–53 
(criticizing Lee’s “audience appeal” joint authorship factor). 
224. Or attempted to be dissected, particularly in the case of inseparable 
contributions. See 2 Patry, supra note 34, at § 5:15 (“[R]equiring all joint 
authors to contribute separately copyrightable material is fatally at odds with 
the statute, which defines ‘joint work’ as encompassing both ‘interdependent’ 
and ‘inseparable’ contributions. Obviously, these terms connote different 
concepts, and it is equally obvious, therefore, that an inseparable contribution 
need not be interdependent.”). 
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false claims should not pose a significant concern. But because Childress 
and Erickson—the decisions most responsible for cementing inde-
pendent copyrightability as a joint authorship requirement—relied on 
copyright scholar Paul Goldstein’s support for this requirement,225 we 
should address a remaining concern that he’s raised, one regarding the 
length of copyright. 
Goldstein has essentially argued that, without the independent 
copyrightability requirement, joint authorship could open up too wide 
to too many people, which would unduly increase the length of copy-
right protection that works receive, keeping them longer from free 
public use.226 This is because, under current law, copyright will protect 
a work for seventy years after the death of its last surviving author.227 
Putting aside the policy question as to whether longer copyright protec-
tion for works is, in general, good or bad, I agree with Professor Gold-
stein that it’s an important goal to reserve joint authorship for those 
who we believe really deserve it, and that the impact joint authorship 
rules have on the length of copyright is another good reason we should 
care about them. I disagree, however, with the premise that we need 
the artificial construct of independent copyrightability in joint author-
ship to accomplish this goal. 
If we judge contributions to collaborative works by their substanti-
ality, as I’ve proposed, we’ll still be able to determine their worthiness 
of being designated as authorship—we’ll just be able to do it better. A 
contribution could, for instance, be independently copyrightable, like a 
few paragraphs of a radio script, but very insubstantial compared to 
the idea driving the script, such as the one behind the War of the 
Worlds broadcast. Would we rather have the length of copyright deter-
mined by the life of the contributor of a short sentence or two of expo-
sitory narration, or by the life of Orson Welles, the one who contributed 
an idea that “was the guide for the dialogue, radio effects, the whole 
organization of the material”?228 I vote the latter. 
Accordingly, with respect to the length of copyright, as well as the 
other concerns (some more real than others) raised by supporters of the 
status quo, I believe that the benefits of recognizing idea-contributors 
as joint authors outweigh the fears. By recognizing idea-contributors, 
we’ll be encouraging the free-flow of ideas within collaborative creative 
teams and, when such ideas contribute substantially to the form and 
content of copyrighted works, we’ll be giving fair credit and compens-
ation to those who generated that value. 
 
225. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991); Erickson v. Trinity 
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070–71 (7th Cir. 1994). 
226. 1 Goldstein, supra note 152, at § 4.2. 
227. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2012). 
228. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
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If we do this with some structure—requiring that idea-contributions 
be substantial as well as that they exist within the context of a pre-
existing working relationship—then I think we can help dispel the fears 
associated with what would be a truly positive change in joint author-
ship doctrine. And, perhaps, we can increase the chances that the courts 
or Congress will make it a reality. 
Conclusion 
“I have a sentimental inclination toward hope.” 
—Orson Welles229 
Mark Rose, chronicler of authorship’s conceptual origins in copy-
right, has observed that our attempts to draw the line between idea 
and expression are, paradoxically, both futile and necessary.230 “Futile 
because the concept of literary property is itself finally an oxymoron. 
But necessary because the institution of copyright is deeply rooted both 
in our economic system and in our conception of ourselves.”231 In claim-
ing that he co-authored the War of the Worlds radio play, Orson Welles 
didn’t ask the courts back then, or us today, to ignore the line between 
idea and expression. To the contrary, I think he merely asked us to 
understand that we don’t need to draw this line—and in fact we 
shouldn’t draw it—between creative collaborators. 
These collaborators, and indeed society as a whole, would be better 
off if we recognized that idea-generation can constitute authorship just 
as much, and sometimes more, than expression. And if two or more 
artists decide to work collaboratively—together generating ideas and 
converting them into expression for our enjoyment—we should be open 
to rewarding through copyright not just the ones who express the ideas 
but also those who generate them. 
“[T]he French believe there are no works, only authors,” Peter 
Bogdanovich recalls telling Orson Wells. “‘Well, I disagree,’ Orson said 
heatedly. ‘I believe there are only works.’”232 If we here, in the collab-
orative context, begin to focus more on works—understanding that 
they’re often a complex web of contributors’ ideas and expression, not 
merely the welding of separate authors’ independent expression—I 
believe we can improve copyright and increase the chances that we’ll 
enjoy the fruits of talents like Welles’s in the future. 
 
 
229. Magician, supra note 178. 
230. Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 8 
(1993). 
231. Id. 
232. Welles & Bogdanovich, supra note 2, at xxxi. 
